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I. INTRODUCTION
The American system of justice assumes that people are teleological
organisms.! In other words, people are thought to have the ability to postulate a set
of facts, calculate the results of a given course of conduct, and behave accordingly.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the United States Supreme Court, explained
the American legal system's approach when he wrote that the law is "guided by a
robust common sense which assumes the freedom of will as a working hypothesis
in the solution of its problems."2 The Court later reaffirmed this proposition by
stating that a "belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty
of the normal individual to choose between good and evil" is a proposition
"universal and persistent in mature systems of law."
Legal doctrines such as insanity, diminished capacity, and chemical
dependency raise issues related to the mental health professions. While there may
be many practical applications for the knowledge that social scientists uncover, one
of the most important uses is in the courtroom. In a criminal case, the jury may
need to establish the mental state of an individual to determine his or her level of
culpability.4 In a tort case, the court may need to determine how a reasonable
person would respond to a given stimulus. In a contract case, the judge may need
to determine whether one of the signatories was fully competent. Courts routinely
turn to mental health experts to try to answer such questions.
When it comes to the issue of free will, however, experts in the social
sciences, especially psychiatry and psychology, are not really expert. They tend
either to dismiss the possibility of free will as a theory of behavior, or they are
confused as to the proper definition of free will. To the modern psychologist, free
will is an archaic remnant of a teleological view of human nature that has long since
been disproved by modern science.
I A teleological explanation invokes ends, purposes, or reasons for why certain items exist or
a course of events takes place. WILLiAM L. REESE, DICTIONARY OF PHILOsOPHY AND RELIGION:
EAsTERN AND WESTERN THOUGHT 371 (1980).
2 Charles C. Steward Mach Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937); see also HERBERT
FINGARETrE, THE MEANING OF CRIMiNAL INSANITY 79 (1972).
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
4 The influence is most obvious with regard to the insanity defense, but defendants also
routinely argue about addictions and other influences that in one way or another excuse actions that
would otherwise subject them to civil liability, if not criminal punishment. These issues have also had
an important effect on public policy. See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social
Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 107, 131.
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Psychologists use the term "agency" to define what lawyers might call free
will. "Agency is the organism's capacity to behave in conformance with, in
contradiction to, in addition to, or without regard for perceived environmental or
biological determinants."5 Agency, however, is widely rejected in psychological
circles. Non-telic environmental or biological determinants, instead, are thought to
shape most behavior. This rejection or confusion about such a basic aspect of the
legal system has resulted in a de-emphasizing of personal responsibility under the
law.
If the legal system is to deal responsibly with defenses and other claims
based on the mental condition of defendants, then courts must develop a coherent
approach that accords psychiatry and psychology their rightful status. The courts
must also, however, demand that psychological and psychiatric expert witnesses
function within the assumptions of the legal system. This is not routinely done
today.
Expert psychiatric and psychological witnesses often frame their testimony
in terms of the scientific foundations and the empirical findings of their disciplines.
Although this concern for scientific validity is important, it can be deceptive.
Scientific proof is guided by theory; empirical evidence must be interpreted. Thus,
the theoretical construct is crucial to understanding the data. Unfortunately,
psychiatry and psychology have poor records when it comes to theories relating to
free will, personal choice, and self-determination.
Most of the theories in psychiatry and psychology today draw on biological
and related mechanistic accounts, which are by their very essence critical of a view
of human beings as capable of behaving according to free will. Due to this
commitment to mechanistic interpretations, psychology has failed to properly test
the free will potential of human beings. Agential capacities are rejected at the
outset. Even when lip service is paid to such human capacities - capacities that
underwrite the legal system - they are presented in a tentative and frequently
garbled manner. Many, if not most, of the mental-health experts who appear before
the court fail to serve the needs ofjustice. This can present serious difficulties to
the judges and lawyers attempting to rely on mental health experts.'
5 JOSEPH F. RYCHLAK, LOGICAL LEARNING THEORY: A HUMAN TELEOLOGY AND ITS EMPIRICAL
SUPPORT 1 (1994) [hereinafter LOGICAL LEARNING THEORY].
6 The recent past has revealed many applications of psychology in general to law. See, e.g.,
IRWIN A. HOROWITz & THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW 6-11 (1984); SAMUEL
MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 389 n. 124 (1982); PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTs (Sally
M. Lloyd-Bostock ed., 1981); PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (Bruce Dennis Sales ed., 1977);
PSYCHOLOGY, LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES (David P. Farrington et al. eds. 1979); THOMAS SANNITO
& PETER MCGOVERN, COURTROOM PSYCHOLOGY FOR TRIAL LAWYERS (1985); JOHN THiBAUT &
LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975); THE LEGAL TRIAL PROCESS (B. Sales ed., 1981);
1997]
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II. FREE WILL AND THE LAW
The legal system's assumption of free will in human affairs is ubiquitous.
It is found in many different areas of law, including wills and deeds7 contracts,'
confessions,9 and criminal law.'" In fact,
[t]he core of criminal law doctrine, centered around the concept of
mens rea and the variety of criminal excuses, probably comes
closer than any other set of social practices to an instantiation of
the Kantian conception of the responsible human subject as the
noumenal self, characterized exclusively by a rational free will
unencumbered by character, temperament, and circumstance."
The Supreme Court has held, "[m]en usually intend to do what they do."'" As
another court put it: "the basic behavioral concept of our social order is free will."'3
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1987); Lawrence M. Friedman,
The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REv. 763, 777-778 (1986); but see DANIEL N. ROBINSON,
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW (1980) (questioning wisdom of psychological invasion of law).
7 See, e.g., Conley v. Nailor, 118 U.S. 127, 134 (1866) ("The influence for which a will or
deed will be annulled must be such as that the party making it has no free will, but stands in vinculis.");
Ralston v. Turpin, 129 U.S. 663, 670 (1889); Mackall v. Mackall, 135 U.S. 167, 172-173 (1890).
8 See, e.g., Jackson v. Ashton, 36 U.S. 229, 238 (1837) ("She was most cruelly tortured; and
her fears, not her free will, gave the promise.").
9 Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 353 (1990) ("Although a defendant may sometimes later
regret his decision to speak with police, the Sixth Amendment does not disable a criminal defendant
from exercising his free will."). In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963), and Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583 (1961), the Court ruled that a confession is admissible only if it is a
product of the defendant's rational intellect and "free will."
10 See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 n.41 (1988) ("But, what does it mean
to say that a child has no criminal responsibility? .... One thing about this does seem clearly implied,
... and that is an absence of the.basis for adult criminal accountability - the exercise of an unfettered
free will.") (quoting S. Fox, THE JUVENILE COURT: ITS CONTEXT, PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES 11-
12 (1967)).
11 Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of The Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959,
1003 (1992).
12 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 434 (1977).
13 People v. Wolff, 394 P.2d 959, 971 (Cal. 1964).
[Vol. 100:193
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At one time in the United States, women 14 and slaves" were denied full
legal responsibility because they were thought to lack the capacity to freely exercise
their will. Minors are still said to lack the capacity to make many decisions
routinely made by adults.16 Most adults today, however, are legally presumed to
have the ability to recognize the consequences of their actions and behave
accordingly. 7
If a person cannot freely direct his or her will, the law generally holds him
or her blameless; the person must freely opt to do wrong before the criminal law
system assigns guilt.' Those who act under duress,19 out of necessity,20 or in self
14 See Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. 173 (1809) (holding that a "feme covert in the
presence of her baron, has no will.").
15 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 477 (1856) (Grier, J., concurring) ("[W]ith the slave,
with one devoid of rights or capacities, civil or political, there could be no pact; that one thus situated
could be no party to, or actor in, the association of those possessing free will, power, discretion.").
16 Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between
Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1519 (1992) ("[Y]oung children do not
qualify as fully accountable moral agents because they have not had sufficient time, experience, or
brain development to fully realize their moral capacities."); Michael S. Moore, Causation and the
Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1091, 1111 (1985) ("A causal theorist attempting to explain why infancy
excuses would liken it to the status conception of insanity: the very young, like the insane, lack free
will."). As the Talmud states, "A deaf-mute, an idiot and a minor are awkward to deal with, as he who
injures them is liable, whereas if they injure others they are exempt." THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD 501-
502 (Edstein ed., 1935).
17 Arenella, supra note 16, at 1521 ("Who satisfies the threshold condition of moral agency in
the law's eyes? Everyone except for the very young, the very crazy, and the severely mentally
retarded.").
18 There are, of course, levels of mens rea other than purpose. This would include negligence,
recklessness, and knowledge. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02-(1995). In addition, there are strict
liability crimes. See id § 2.05.
19 See id § 2.09(1) (allowing an affirmative defense when confronted with "the use of, or a
threat to use, unlawful force.., which a person of reasonable firmness... would have been unable
to resist").
20 See id § 3.02(1) ("Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil
to himself or to another is justifiable [in enumerated situations].").
19971
5
Rychlak and Rychlak: Mental Health Experts on Trial: Free Will and Determinism in the
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1997
WEST VIRGINIA L,4W REVIEW
defense2' - being propelled, as it were, by an outside force" - are usually given a
full or partial defense.' Similarly, criminal defendants driven by an "irresistible
impulse" are often excused for their behavior.24
Assuming that moral culpability is the basis for inflicting criminal
punishment2 "free will is an essential prerequisite to criminal liability."'26 Perhaps
'the most important justification for the infliction of punishment is that it serves to
affirm the wrongdoer's basic humanity?7 As an example, consider the case of A:
21 See id § 3.04.
22 In recognizing the mens rea aspects of an illegal deed, the law makes allowances for actions
that are not the product of free will. Thus, a person who suffers an epileptic seizure while driving an
automobile might injure or kill a pedestrian, or a person with a brain tumor might concoct an irrational
fear of someone and attack this person in a deluded sense of self-defense. In each of these cases, a
physical condition is at the center of the problem, and the legal system therefore provides an "out" to
the defendant - a legal defense of insanity or a solid'argument that there was no mens rea. Of course,
when a system recognizes that behavior is not always a product of the actor's will, it creates the
opportunity for abuse. Consider the following hypothetical argument made by a criminal defendant:
I am incapable of internalizing moral norms and ... my ability to defer
immediate gratification of my antisocial desires is very weak because of
constitutional facts about my nature and developmental factors in my early
socialization.
To use theirjargon, I never developed a superego. While I can articulate
what morality requires of me, I have no "affective" understanding of morality's
value or purpose....
So how can I deserve moral blame for becoming the sort of person who
violates community norms?
Arenella, supra note 16, at 1565-1566.
23 The tough question in these cases usually relates to whether that outside force was truly the
cause of the behavior. If it was, the defendant usually is exempt from punishment.
24 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1995). See also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Two Concepts of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 269 (1996) (discussing
emotion's impact on behavior).
25 See Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the
Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 325 (1990).
26 Paul H. Robinson, I Criminal Law Defenses 25(a), at 91 n.2 (1984).
27 Punishment is justified when the criminal, "as a free agent, has exercised his choice in such
a way as to make the punishment a necessary consequence." EDMUND L. PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE
OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 8 (1966); see also Lloyd L. Weinreb, Desert, Punishment, and Criminal
Responsibility, 49 LAW & CONTEvIP. PROBS. 47 (1986) (arguing that "desert" is necessary in any theory
of punishment). As such, it may be said that punishment is "the systematic moral response to
wrongdoing." Robert J. Lipkin, The Moral Good Theory of Punishment, 40 U. FLA. L. REv. 17, 81
[Vol. 100:193
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Upon hearing someone call his name [at a party], he inadvertently
knocks over the glass [on a nearby table]. Suppose that A could
not have been expected to be more careful than he was. Still, it
would be perfectly natural for him, as well as expected of him, to
feel some embarrassment and to offer to wipe up the spilled wine
.... By his responsible stance, A reclaims his body from the
status of a mere object that he most of the time successfully
manipulates and invests it instead with the significance and
meaning of an aspect of himself as subject.28
Without recognition of such responsibility, A is nothing more than a product of his
environment, accountable neither for mistakes nor for great achievement?9 It is
only when the individual chooses to do what he or she does as a matter of free will
(1988). Therefore, it has been argued that punishment is how society acknowledges the integrity of
the person.
From the point of view of abstract right, there is only one theory of punishment
which recognizes human dignity in the abstract, and that is the theory of Kant,
especially in the more rigid formula given to it by Hegel. Hegel says:
"Punishment is the right of the criminal. It is an act of his own will. The violation
of right has been proclaimed by the criminal as his own right. His crime is the
negation of right. Punishment is the negation of this negation, and consequently
an affirmation of right, solicited and forced upon the criminal by himself."
Karl Marx, Capital Punishment, NEW YORK DAILY TRIBUNE, Feb. 18, 1853, quoted in J. Murphy,
Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 217 (1973). If the person is not treated as the
author of his or her actions, but a mere instrument, then the person is deprived of the role of creator.
The satisfaction of personal achievement is closed to the person. PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 523 (J. Feinberg
and H. Gross eds., 2d ed. 1980). As such, it has been argued that there is a fundamental right to
punishment, which stems from the fundamental right to be treated as a person. Morris, Persons and
Punishment 52 THE MONIST 475 (Oct. 1968), reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW at 582. Morris argues
that a right to punishment derives from the fundamental right to be treated as a person, and denial of
this right implies the denial of all moral rights and duties, hence the denial of the right to be human.
Id.; see also MAX SCHELER, FORMALISM IN ETHICS AND NON-FORMAL ETHICS OF VALUES 366
(Manfred S. Frings & Roger L. Funk trans., 3d ed. 1973) (discussing moral right to punishment);
Martin R. Gardner, The Right to be Punished-A Suggested Constitutional Theory, 33 RUTGERS L.
REV. 838 (1981) (presenting the right to punishment as a constitutional right); but see John Deigh, On
the Right to Be Punished: Some Doubts, 94 ETHICS 191 (1984).
28 Dan-Cohen, supra note 11, at 978.
29 [L]ike a cockroach, you are in no position to make moral choices of your own
free will. When you commit some hideous brutality, it is not that you decided to
do so. No, on the contrary, external circumstances made you do it. Once that
message is fully absorbed by potential criminals as well as by their judges and
juries, civility and safety will be doomed.
Daniel Lapin, Darwin is Dead, CRISIS, November 1995, at 56.
19971
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that responsibility attaches." 'Thus, the legal system looks to outside experts to
provide evidence relating to the causes of behavior.
III. CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR
The actual cause of a person's behavior is not easily identified. Indeed, the
very concept of "a cause" is not always clear to those who use this term. The
source of the word "cause" in the Greek world came from the ancient judicial
practice in which responsibility for some alleged illegality was decided upon by the
court. The Greek word that Aristotle selected for "cause" was aitid which translates
"responsible for."' Thus, causation means to determine the responsibility for why
a given thing exists, is happening, or is likely to take place.
In the same way that physicists seek to find the cause or the responsibility
for physical happenings, psychologists seek to find the cause or the responsibility
for human actions. Like physicists, psychologists use experiments and logic to
answer theoretical questions. Their ultimate goal is to frame a cohesive theory to
explain human nature. The search for such a theory is as old as recorded history.32
A. The Four Causes
More than 2000 years ago Aristotle articulated the four causes that
philosophers, theologians, and scientists have used ever since to explain both
physical reactions and human behavior?3 These four causes, which may also
30 When blame can be put on an outside force, the individual feels little
compulsion to better himself or herself. This has led to some interesting denials
of responsibility. For instance, in Florida, Douglas Jackson filed several suits -
one because the prison served him cold food and another because he did not have
access to public television, leaving him with only "junk TV." How was a guy
supposed to get rehabilitated, Jackson demanded, if all he saw on TV was
"murder, rape, nudity, profanity and the like?"
Dale Van Atta, The Scandal of Prisoner Lawsuits, READER'S DIGEST, April, 1996, at 65.
31 Aristotle, Physics, in 8 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, 257, 271 (Robert M.
Hutchins ed., 1952).
32 See Frank J. Yartz, ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY: SOURCEBOOK AND PERSPECTIVE 147
(1984).
33 The names for the causes were coined by Aristotle, but the concepts had been employed by
earlier philosophers. See Joseph F. Rychlak, The Necessity and Desirability of Being Repressed:
Freudianism, Behaviorism, and the Denial of Human Agency, in THIS WILL HURT: THE RESTORATION
OF VIRTUE & CIVIC ORDER 105 (Digby Anderson ed., 1995) [hereinafter Necessity and Desirability].
[Vol. 100:193
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appropriately be described as determinants or limitations,34 are material causation,
efficient causation, formal causation, and final causation.35 These causes can work
individually or in combination with any of the other causes to influence (positively
or negatively) the behavior of anything in nature. Taken together, these four causes
cover all of the influences that determine why anything exists, is happening or is
likely to take place, including human behavior.
1. Material Causation
Material causation relates to the composition of the object in question.
Thus, when chemicals are combined in a given ratio, they always react in a certain
way. They are incapable of behaving differently from what their chemical makeup
dictates. A rubber ball will bounce in ways that a steel ball will not. In humans, we
might say that physical limitations (age, infirmity, disease, etc.) serve as a material
cause (or limit) on ability. A person born with inferior physical equipment is
limited (determined) in the number and variety of behaviors that he or she might
carry out. By the same token, a physically gifted person is capable of doing things
that put others in awe. Thus, one might say that the material-cause determinism of
professional athletes is far less restrictive than it is with other people. In fact, it is
enhancing.
2. Efficient Causation
Efficient causation is an external force applied to the object or person in
question, bringing about a consequent event. Thus, gravity is the efficient cause of
a raindrop falling to earth. Similarly, when the cue ball strikes another pool ball,
it is an efficient cause of the second ball's movement. 6  In behavioristic
34 The word "determine" has Latin roots meaning to set a limit on something. As applied to
behavior, the limitations are usually thought of as alternatives that might be carried out in the course
of events but are prevented from taking place. It is important to note that these causes may not be the
necessary precedent to a consequent event. Rather, they often serve to limit possible consequences.
Thus, gravity might be described as a cause for why rain falls, but it is also a limit on a person's ability
to dunk a basketball. So, to "determine" may be defined not only as to cause a certain end, but also
to limit the number of alternatives that might take place.
35 Aristotle, supra note 31, at 271.
36 Human behavior has been described as occurring according to the same type of force that
impels a raindrop from the sky. See Clark L. Hull, Mind, Mechanism, and Adaptive Behavior, 44
PSYCHOL. REV. 2 (1937). More commonly, a pattern of behavior is explained as being prompted by
efficiently caused influences from the past. See, e.g., Donald 0. Hebb, What Psychology is About, 29
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 71, 75 (1974).
19971
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psychology, when a stimulus brings about a response, the response is thought to
take place just like pool balls, in efficient cause fashion.37 All mechanistic theories
of psychology rely fundamentally on efficient causation to explain human behavior.
Indeed, this is what most psychologists believe "a cause" to be.38
3. Formal Causation
Formal causation is best described as essential shapes and patterns that
enable things to occur one way rather than another. A ball can roll because of its
shape. Similarly, the software program of a computer embraces a formal-cause
patterning that determines precisely how a line of "reasoning" will be carried out
37 There are two major explanations of conditioning. Classical (Pavlovian) conditioning
follows a strict stimulus-response interpretation of how behavior is caused. The (antecedent) stimulus
is said to elicit a (consequent) response automatically, without any active effort on the part of the
organism. Thus, a dog can be conditioned to salivate to a flashing light by blowing powdered meat
into its mouth immediately following the presentation of the light. The foodstuff naturally elicits
salivation, and can serve as a reinforcement. Soon, the flashing light takes over to cause the salivation
even before the powder is blown into the animal's mouth. The dog is blindly shaped by circumstances
inefficient cause fashion to respond with salivation to a flashing light.
Operant (Skinnerian) conditioning suggests that responses are not elicited, but rather emitted.
B.F. SKINNER, ABouTBEHAVIORISM 52-53 (1974). Emission suggests a more active role for the animal
in the conditioning process, though it is still described in efficient cause terminology. Thus, a bird may
occasionally peck at the bark of a tree, or an infant may wave its hand while grasping a rattle. If,
however, the bird pecks more frequently because insects are being churned up as the bark splits, or the
infant's hand waves more rapidly because of the rattle's sound, this would indicate an operant type of
conditioning. The bird and the infant have "operated" behaviorally to produce a contingent state of
affairs that is reinforcing. One might attribute a physical reward to the bird, who devours the insects,
but there is no such discernible physical drive impelling the child's movement. Nevertheless, both the
noise and the insects raise the level of responding and thus they are taken as contingencies.
Another way in which Skinner discussed the control of behavior was through aversive
stimulation - frequently mistaken with negative reinforcement. B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND
DIGNITY 61 (1971). In this case, the aversive stimulation causes behavior to cease rather than to rise.
Legal sanctions are of this variety. Do certain acts and you can be punished by legal sanction.
Physical injury (spanking a child) can also be a reflection of control through aversive stimulation.
The point of importance is that operant conditioning is just as "blind" and mechanical as is
classical conditioning. Both theories hold that organisms are "shaped," without intention on the
organism's part, by the conditioning.
38 Jon Duns Scotus (1265-1308) coined the term "contingency," explaining that a contingent
cause was an efficient cause that was made dependent on an act ofwill. In short, the original concept
of contingency underwrote free will decisions. MASTERPIECES OF WORLD PHILOSOPHY IN SUMMARY
FORM 334 (Frank N. Magill & Dan P. McGreal eds., 1961). Yet the modem psychologist, relying
entirely on efficient causation, dismisses the person's intentions and claims that behavior is blindly
shaped. See B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 200 (1971).
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as the computer organizes, processes, and presents data?9 In terms of human
behavior, customs or laws that define approved and unapproved patterns of living
can be viewed as formal causes. Thus, Americans drive on the right side of the road
due to the influences of both law and custom, two formal causes.4
4. Final Causation
Final causation takes place when something exists or a course of action is
undertaken for the sake of an end. Aristotle defined the final cause as behaving "for
the sake of' a premising reason, plan, or purpose. ' Such "grounds" act as the end
toward which the actor intends to go. A theory based on final-cause determinism
is therefore a teleological formulation (telos is Greek for "end"), which posits that
things exist and events take place for a reason ("end") that is intentionally being
worked toward or actually realized. Aristotle took this approach to all events in
nature; thus leaves were said to exist for the intention of shading fruit on the limbs
of trees, and skeletons existed for the purpose of supporting the flesh of living
bodies. Because final causation is fundamental to the free will conception, it
follows that final causation is a basic consideration in all legal judgments.42
39 The computer's hardware moves this patterned analytical process along mechanically
(efficient causation). As such, material- and efficient-cause determinism combine in the total action.
40 Criminal laws, as they are laid out in state and federal statutes, function as a formal-cause
determination of behavior. Of course, the men and women who framed the laws could be said to be
under a final-cause determination as well. Laws are the "thats" (i.e., reasons) for the sake of which
their framers intended that the society be organized. See DANIEL N. ROBINSON, PSYCHOLOGY AND
LAW: CAN JUSTICE SURVIVE THE SOCIAL SCIENCES? (1980). The United States Constitution is
regularly reviewed to see whether some current practice meets with the original intent of its drafters
(indicating a final-cause influence). Even so, once a law is framed and is capable of standing alone,
it can be said to reflect primarily a formal-cause determination on the affairs of people.
41 Aristotle, supra note 31, at 271.
42 One clear problem that develops with the concept of final causation is the distinction
between the introspective and extraspective viewpoint. Individuals might feel that they freely choose
to act in a given way, but an outside observer might also be able to predict that behavior by viewing
the actor's situation. Thus, the extraspective viewpoint cannot directly observe, measure, or weigh
final-causal factors. If observable behavior can be predicted, is it really a matter of will?
Much modem psychological testing ignores the possibility of an introspective or "personal"
viewpoint, and studies usually do not even test for it. This creates problems with both the methods
used to test causation and the initial premise of the experiments. As such, the results cannot accurately
capture what takes place when freely-willing human beings are studied. The humans are forced to
behave according to the experimenter's prearranged aims in the experimental design, which invariably
exclude a valid assessment of the person's agency. It is for this reason that psychologists continue to
claim that people are shaped by reinforcements even though empirical evidence suggests that there is
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B. The Demise of Final Causation
A final-cause explanation of human behavior was common in science until
the 16th century, but a combination of events caused it to fall from grace. The issue
surfaced with Galileo's notorious clash with the Roman Catholic Church. The
Church had essentially adopted a final-cause explanation for the earth's placement
at the center of the solar system: God wanted it there! 3 When Galileo's science
indicated that the sun, not the earth, was at the center of the solar system, it was a
threat to both the Church's authority and to the use of final-cause description in
natural science.'
Sir Francis Bacon led the assault on final-cause description of natural and
scientific phenomena.45 He argued that it was bad science to explain that trees have
leaves "for the sake of" shading fruit or that bones exist "for the sake of" holding
up flesh.46 Whereas Aristotle had argued that using all four causes in every
no convincing evidence for conditioning in adults. See William F. Brewer, There Is No Convincing
Evidence for Operant or Classical Conditioning in Adult Humans, in COGNITION AND THE SYMBOLIC
PROCESSES I (W.B. Weimer & D.S. Palermo eds., 1974).
A related problem stems from formal causation because it is frequently referred to in the
language of both perspectives. When one sees the funnel cloud of a tornado, he or she is seeing a
formal cause extraspectively. Such a person might say "a tornado is coming" because of this
extraspectively perceived shape (i.e., formal cause). On the other hand, when someone says "I have
a plan for how to avoid the destruction of funnel clouds" he or she is speaking of a formal-cause
pattern (i.e., the plan) from an introspective perspective, the "I" who framed the plan.
43 This is in keeping with Aristotle's attribution of intentionality or purposivity to everything
in nature. As noted above, he suggested that leaves on a tree exist for the sake of shading fruit on the
branches. He thus concluded that nature is a cause "that operates for a purpose." Aristotle, supra note
3 1, at 277. Similarly, religious views holding that God created things according to a divine plan can
be seen two ways. Viewed introspectively - from God's viewpoint- the plan is the "that" for the sake
of which things take place. However, from the extraspective point of view - the human viewpoint -
the plan is unknown. Humans simply observe the effects of God's already established premises. And
of course, if the plan is not revealed, scientists must question whether there is such a plan.
"A deity teleology is not the same thing as a human teleology, but the very idea of assigning
intentions to scientific explanations was brought into question by this confrontation between science
and religion." Necessity and Desirability, supra note 33, at 106. It might appear that there is always
a religious basis for teleology, but religion is not needed to accept the tenants of teleology or final
causation. See LOGICAL LEARNING THEORY, supra note 5, at 9 (discussing Nietzsche's teleology).
44 EDwINA. BURTr, THE METAPHYsICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYSICAL SCIENCE 98-104
(1955).
45 BENJAMIN FARRINGTON, FRANCIS BACON: PHILOSOPHER OF INDUsTRIAL SCIENCE 64 (1949).
46 Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning in 30 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 45
(Robert M. Hutchins ed., 1952).
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scientific explanation enriched the resultant account, Bacon felt that material and
efficient causes were sufficient standing alone.
For to say that "the hairs of the eye-lids are for a quickset and
fence about the sight"; or that "the firmness of the skins and hides
of living creatures is to defend them from the extremities of heat
and cold"; or that "the bones are for the columns or beams,
whereupon the frames of the bodies of living creatures are built";
or that "the leaves of trees are for protecting of the fruit"; ... or
that "the solidness of the earth is for the station and mansion of
living creatures," and the like, is well inquired and collected in
metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. Nay, they are
indeed but remoraes and hindrances to stay and slug the ship from
further sailing; and have brought this to pass, that the search of the
physical causes hath been neglected and passed in silence.47
"Thus, the Baconian Criticism holds that telic description should not be used to
explain physical events, for it adds nothing to the account." '48 According to Bacon,
a final-cause description was suitable for metaphysical explanations or for matters
relating to aesthetics and ethics.49 When it came to the study of physics, however,
he argued that scientists should explain the "how" of natural processes with material
and efficient causation, and avoid the teleological analysis of "why" altogether.0
Sir Isaac Newton developed a theory of science that fell in line with the
Baconian Criticism. Newtonian science, also called "natural science," posited that
nature and all of its contents could be explained in a mathematical formula. If one
were only able to determine all of the precise influences on a body, one could
determine the future, because like balls on a pool table, everything simply reacts to
outside forces. In the non-telic Newtonian universe, physics was reduced to laws
yielding predictable results that "conform to the expectations of an experienced
observer."'51 There was, of course, no room for final-cause determinism in such a
world. "Newtonian science was to rely exclusively on material and efficient cause
47 Id.
48 LOGICAL LEARNING THEORY, supra note 5, at 9.
49 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
so See Bacon, supra note 46, at 45.
51 Ron Haybron, Planck Set Newton Straight, THE PLAIN DEALER, (Cleveland), June 1, 1993,
at8C.
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explanations. Indeed, the phrase 'natural science' is tantamount to saying 'science
without final causation'.
This seemed to be a neat and clean explanation of the world. If the precise
location of all particles were known, and if all outside influences were known and
measured, then thanks to the efficient cause nature of reality, one could accurately
predict the way everything would take place. Scientists strove to find what
conditions and events occur in nature, for if that were ever known, the future would
also be known. The idea was "that a superhuman intelligence acquainted with the
position and motions of the atoms at any moment could predict the whole course of
future events." 3 After all, because there was a finite number of elements in the
universe, the future organization of reality had to be some combination of their
efficiently caused effects. By this same reasoning, humans would be able to
produce a model of the world just by placing a set of elements into motion from
certain points.54 There was no room for anything as uncertain (or unverifiable) as
free will or final causation in this kind of science.55
The "clockwork universe" theory seemed to fit with scientific discoveries
of that era. Chemistry was becoming uniform, and with each new experiment, the
case for efficient cause determinism was strengthened. Certain chemicals, mixed
in precise measures, always rendered the same result. Objects reacted to gravity in
predictable ways. A given force, applied to a stationary object, would always move
that object the same distance. In short, material and efficient causation seemed to
explain just about everything that could be tested. The testing at this time, however,
did not focus on human behavior.
52 Necessity and Desirability, supra note 33, at 107.
53 BURTr, supra note 44, at 96 (quoting LaPlace).
54 See Percy W. Bridgman, Determinism in Modern Science, in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM
IN THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 43-63 (Sidney Hook ed., 1958).
55 Id at 51. The times and the science have, however, changed. Not only in the social sciences,
but also in the "hard sciences," modem research indicates that there is room for final causation. It was
this realization that caused physicist Joseph Ford to respond to Einstein's proclamation (that God does
not play dice with the universe) by asserting that God does indeed play dice, "[b]ut they're loaded dice.
And the main objective of physics now is to find out by what rules were they loaded and how can we
use them for our own ends." JAMES GLEIK, CHAOS: MAKING ANEw SCIENCE 314 (1987).
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IV. THE NEWTONIAN BASIS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY
The late 19th century was the heyday of British empiricism.56 Efficient
cause explanations, based on Newton's view of the universe, were all-powerful in
that era. Because psychology emerged as a science during this time, it is not
surprising to find its roots firmly planted in efficient cause soil. Freudian
psychoanalysis and modem behaviorist psychology both trace their roots back to the
Newtonian ideal.57
Early academic psychology was greatly influenced by the renowned
physicist, Herman von Holmholtz, who argued that human behavior was limited to
the same physical laws that all other natural structures obey.58 Thus, he wrote, "the
phenomena of nature are to be referred back to motions of material particles
possessing unchangeable moving forces, which are dependent upon conditions of
space alone." 9 The aim was to describe behavior without attributing any of the
responsibility to "unscientific" final-cause determinism. "The truth is, psychology
is more Newtonian in conception than any other modem science."60
Freud even seems to have adapted his theory to meet the expectation of his
Newtonian colleagues, reluctantly substituting his libido theory for earlier
references to his patients' wishes.6" A wish is telic in formulation, a mental image
or thought carried on "for the sake of" some highly desired end (final causation).
Libido, on the other hand, is a material- or efficient-cause concept that presumably
motors the personality structure instrumentally. Freud could always explain his
cases in terms of either wishes or libidinal investments, reserving the latter
explanations in particular for his Newtonian colleagues.
56 LOGICAL LEARNING THEORY, supra note 5, at 6.
57 Necessity and Desirability, supra note 33, at 107; see infra notes 72-79 and accompanying
text.
58 See ILYA PRIGOGINE & ISABELLE STENGERS, ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: MAN'S DIALOGUE WITH
NATURE 96 (1984).
59 Herman von Helmholtz, Uber die Erhaltung der Kraft, in 1 THE NATURE OF GASES AND
HEAT 92 (S. Brush trans., 1965).
60 Ronald J. Rychlak and Joseph F. Rychlak, Free Will is a Viable, Verifiable Assumption: A
Reply to Garrett and Viney, 8 NEW IDEAS IN PSYCHOL. 43, 44 (1990) [hereinafter A Reply]; see also
JOSEPH F. RYCHLAK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RIGOROUS HUMANISM (2d ed. 1988).
61 See Necessity and Desirability, supra note 33, at 108, 109, 111-12.
62 See supra note 37.
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Another highly influential early psychologist, John B. Watson, is generally
regarded as the father of behaviorism. He said, "Let us try to think of man as an
assembled organic machine ready to run.'"3 A machine, of course, operates through
material and efficient causation, with no consideration of final causation.'
If we believe that people are machines then they are no longer
agents. They cannot evaluate and then set the grounds for the sake
of which they will be influenced, determined, shaped, and so forth.
This has been the guiding assumption of behaviorist theory for
most of the 20th century. Rather than look to the individual for a
personal influence on behavior, we must look to the environment,
because all the person can do is respond in efficient-cause fashion
to the stimulations of the environment. 65
This approach to behavior, of course, fits perfectly with the Newtonian view of
science.
A. Psychology's View of Will
Psychopathologists can be found who will present the entire gamut of
determinism. Medically-trained psychiatrists may stress biological factors relying
on some combination of material- and efficient-cause determinism to make their
case. Behavioristically-oriented psychologists are likely to stress the efficient cause
determinisms stemming from childhood and the environment. Humanistic
psychologists may place some emphasis on personal responsibility or final
causation, but they are the exception. The dominant psychological theories share
one common element. They all see human behavior as being primarily shaped by
outside forces. This reflects efficient cause determinism, which rests at the heart
of most psychological profiles of human behavior. Agency, free will, or final-cause
determinism plays only a negligible role in this modem understanding of human
behavior.
63 JOHN B. WATSON, BEHAVIORISM 216 (1924).
64 See WILLIS L. REESE, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION: EASTERN AND WESTERN
THOUGHT 345 (1980); DAGOBERT D. RUNES, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 194 (1960). Recently,
computers have become more the model than machines. See HOWARD GARDNER, THE MIND'S NEW
SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION (1985).
65 Necessity and Desirability, supra note 33, at 109-10.
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There are hundreds of "mainstream" theories of human behavior, 6 but they
can be grouped into four basic schools: organic-biological, psychodynamic,
behavioral, and cognitive. All of these modem schools of thought, however, do
share one thing in common: an efficient cause view of human behavior.
1. Organic-Biological Theories
The organic theories look to brain impairment or dysfunction to explain
improper behavior. This approach developed as the scientific community departed
from moral or religious explanations for disordered behavior. As theorists went
from religious explanations to a more scientific approach in the late 18th and early
19th centuries,67 they focused attention on the pathology of the brain,6" seeking
organic determinants of mental disorder 9 Theorists from this school seek to
explain abnormal behavior as the result of injury to the brain.7"
The closely related biological view of psychology points to chemicals,
hormones, and bodily processes as the "answers" to our behavioral questions. Thus,
genetics and biochemicals are thought to be the (material) "cause" of behavior. We
now know that chemical imbalances can alter personality. The primary problem,
66 Even without addressing the marginal theories, psychiatric and psychological theories that
have a major following and apparent legitimacy number in the hundreds. See COMPREHEN IVE
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY/1V (Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock eds., 4th ed. 1985).
67 See MICHAEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION (1965).
68 See WILHELM GRIESINGER, THE PATHOLOGY AND THERAPY OF PSYCHIC DISORDERS (1845);
ALBRECT BON GALLER, ELEMENTS OF PHYSIOLOGY (1757); W. EMIL KRAEPELIN, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
(A. Ross Diefendorftrans., 2d ed. 1915).
69 See, e.g., KRAEPELIN, supra note 68, at 3-22.
70 See generally STANISLAV ANDRESKI, SYPHILIS, PURITANISM AND WITCH HUNTS: HISTORICAL
EXPLANATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF MEDICINE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS WITH A FORECAST ABOUT AIDS
(1989).
The concept of dualism took organic theory to new heights. Descartes is normally identified
as the father of modem dualism. Based on his personal introspections, Descartes believed that human
reasoning occurred in a realm that had no extension, as did physical structures like the physical body.
See Ren6 Descartes, Meditation II: Of the Nature of the Human Mind; And That It Is More Easily
Known Than The Body, in A DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND SELECTED WRITINGS 93, 93-103 (John
Veitch trans., 1951). This led him to frame a dualism of soul (mind) and body. Eventually, he
postulated that these two realms could exchange influence via the pineal gland, which straddled the
two lobes of the brain and acted as the point of exchange between the physical brain and the non-
physical mind. An input, command, or emotion would have to pass through this gland to reach
"consciousness." See DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 34, 105-06 (1991) (discussing
Descartes' theory).
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from a legal perspective is that it is often difficult to prove that a physiological
condition is more than just a resistible influence. Many people with deficiencies
are fully capable of conforming to the requirements of law. This difficulty in
proving a direct causal relationship is where biology-based defenses usually fall
short."
2. Psychodynamic Theories
The psychodynamic psychological theories explain behavior as the result
of internalized (sometimes unconscious) influences.! 2 Psychoanalysis is based on
this theory of behavior.' Freud explained irrational behavior in his patients by
looking to unconscious conflicts between natural instincts and societal demands.
The unconscious mind contains the biological, instinctual, and sexual drives, which
seek release.74 In contrast to the unconscious realm of the mind is the conscious
realm, which operates at a logical, rational, and adaptive level!5 These conflicts,
usually originating in childhood, eventually reassert themselves "through new and
devious channels."76 This is what leads to odd or irrational behavior.
Complicating the free will issue is the common presumption that someone
under the direction of an unconscious mental process is necessarily operating
without free will.77 The theory holds that these submerged motivations must be
71 These defenses have been raised but have not fared well in criminal cases. See generally
Deborah W. Denno, Comment, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free Ride?,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1988).
72 See Sigmund Freud, The Unconscious, in THE MAJOR WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 428, 428-
30 (1986) [hereinafter The Unconscious].
73 See CHRISTOPHER BADCOCK, ESSENTIAL FREUD 1-3 (1988).
74 The Unconscious, supra note 72, at 434.
75 Id.
76 Id
77 When Freud formalized his concepts of id and ego (with super-ego as a derivative of the
latter) he muddied the waters because he made it possible for the ego to be in the unconscious region
of mind yet also be in consciousness at the same time. This capacity that the ego has - to be spread
out across different levels (or regions) - enabled Freud to say that an unconscious wish (hoped-for
intention) or a conflict between such wishes (e.g., to love and hate someone at the same time) is always
known by the person in such a dilemma; it is known unconsciously. See Joseph Breuer & Sigmund
Freud, Studies on Hysteria, in 2 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS
OF SIGMUND FREUD 117 (James Strachey ed., 1962) [hereinafter COMPLETE WORKS OF FREUD];
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elevated to the conscious level through psychoanalysis in order to understand
motivations. Since the beliefs and desires that motivate actions are not accessible
to the individual, there are those who would argue that he or she is not responsible
for the behavior. 78  This theory suggests that psychoanalysis, not criminal
punishment or attribution of legal responsibility, is the appropriate response to these
influences that shape behavior.79
3. Behaviorism
Behaviorism may be "the single most influential school of psychology in
the English-speaking world."' Behavioral theories seek to address the full range
of human behavior, rather than only abnormal or extreme behavior, as most other
theories of human action seek to do.8' Behaviorists aim to explain behavior as an
Sigmund Freud, The Unconscious, in 14 COMPLETE WORKS OF FREUD at 166. The meaning of
"unconscious" at this point shades over into something like"the unadmitted." There is an unadmitted
cognizance of what is known in one region (psychic unconsciousness). Freud more than once referred
to that "strange state of mind in which one knows and does not know a thing at the same time." Breuer
& Freud, supra at 117 n.1. The id, ego, and super-ego would be unable to work out compromises if
such a paradoxical mental capacity did not exist. Elaborate mental gyrations are gone through quite
intentionally by these homunculi to keep unconscious wishes (i.e., "ends") out of the conscious region
of mind. 20 COMPLETE WORKS OF FREUD at 162. This is why Freud could say that the essence of
repression is that it is an intentional act. Breuer & Freud, supra. at 116.
Since the ego is knowledgeable about the external world as well as the wishes of the id and
the super-ego, it has to be considered conscious. The unconscious aspect of the ego even "inoculates"
its conscious portion against gaining insight by somehow causing it to be anxious. There is always this
one aspect of mind in Freud that has access to the conscious realm, the "ego." As such, the ego is both
conscious and unconscious, as is the super-ego. See NORMAN CAMERON & JOSEPH F. RYCHLAK,
PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: A DYNAMIC APPROACH 123-31 (2d ed. 1985).
78 See generally Michael S. Moore, Responsibility and the Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
1563, 1641 (1980) ("If all consdious mental life is determined by unconscious mental states, as many
psychoanalysts believe, why is everyone not excused for all of his actions, seemingly the product of
his conscious decisions but in fact... determined by his unconscious mental states?").
79 There are other views which see in the unconscious negotiations and compromises of id, ego,
and super-ego an innate capacity for free will taking place. See JOSEPH F. RYCHLAK, IN DEFENSE OF
HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS 263-291 (1997).
80 PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, MATrER AND CONSCIOUSNESS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 88 (1984).
81 See DANIEL W. SHUMAN, PSYCHIATRICAND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 39-40 (1986 & Supp.
1992).
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elaborate sequence of efficient causation, engaging the organism in its environment
82without purpose or intention.
Behaviorism as a specific approach was framed initially by John Watson,83
and it adopted the classical Pavlovian concept of conditioning.84 Behaviorism was
later broadened to include psychologists like B.F. Skinner85 and Donald Lindsley,86
who applied operant conditioning to both animals and people. Although classical
(Pavlovian) and operant (Skinnerian) conditioning differ in how the nature of the
response is viewed, 7 both approaches continue to attribute behavior to efficient
causation."
Behaviorists look only to observable physical activity for an explanation of
human behavior, maintaining that concepts like agency, free will, and final
causation are nothing but unverifiable conjecture.89 Behaviorism thus reflects the
82 Behavioral scientists think statistically and look for the nature of variation. At one time,
variation was attributed to the will. Today, few scientists use free will to explain variation, though
"examples abound of variation as a function of age, health, literacy, intelligence, sex, socioeconomic
status, political or religious persuasion, and emotional stability." Wayne Viney, The Tempering Effect
of Determinism in the Legal System: A Response to Rychlak and Rychlak, 8 NEW IDEAS IN
PSYCHOLOGY 37 (1990).
83 See John B. Watson, Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It, 20 PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
158-77 (1913). Watson was influenced by Edward Thomdike. See HENRY GLEITMAN, BASIC
PSYCHOLOGY 72-73, 77-79 (3d ed. 1992).
84 See IVAN P. PAVLOv, CONDITIONED REFLEXES: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PHYSIOLOGICAL
ACTIVITY OF THE CEREBRAL CORTEX (1927); see also supra note 37.
85 For good overviews of the work of B.F. Skinner, see B.F. SKINNER: CONSENSUS AND
CONTROVERSY (Sohan Modgil & Celia Modgil eds., 1987); THE OPERANT BEHAVIORISM OF B.F.
SKINNER: COMMENTS AND CONSEQUENCES (A. Charles Catania & Stevan Hamad eds., 1988); see also
STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES 74-75 (1988).
86 See generally BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: CONTRIBUTIONS TO EDUCATION (Sidney W. Bijou
& Roberto Ruiz eds., 1981); IV BRAIN FUNCTION, BRAIN FUNCTION AND LEARNING (Donald B.
Lindsley & Arthur A. Lumsdaine eds., 1967); SKINNER, supra note 85.
87 See supra note 37.
88 See supra note 37.
89 CHURCHLAND, supra note 80, at 88.
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"hard science" approach that Skinner felt would legitimize the field of psychology.'
There are, however, problems with behaviorism, and these problems have affected
subsequent research.
Since efficient cause actions are the most readily observed, and behaviorist
theory has researchers looking only for observable influences, it was inevitable that
behaviorists would develop a mechanistic image of the human being?' "[H]uman
action for Skinner is determined by the environment, and not beliefs or desires
generated sua sponte. Under this rubric, attributions of moral responsibility are
impossible, since all behavior is caused by external forces, and no free will is
involved." Skinner himself wrote that "autonomous man is a device used to
explain what we cannot explain in any other way.""3  Otherwise stated, "[a]
fundamental Skinnerian position seems, on the surface, totally incompatible with
a concern for human worth and individuality."' As such, behaviorism is in
fundamental conflict with the legal system's notions of justice and personal
responsibility.
4. Cognitive Psychology
"Cognitive psychology" is the term given to the study of how people detect,
transform, store, retrieve, and use information from the environment. It is really an
umbrella term for disciplines that seek to understand behavior by looking at the way
people process information and make decisions. The cognitivists postulate that the
mind is made up of (a) a hard-wired program which processes inputs; (b) the inputs
themselves; (c) outputs, which are similar to the efficient cause "effects" of the
behaviorist; and (d) feedback, which is a part of the output returning as input.
Cognitive psychologists generally agree on an information-processing model, which
holds that information proceeds through a series of identifiable stages including a
90 See CHURCHLAND, supra note 80, at 88; but see Andrew E. Lelling, Eliminative Materialism,
Neuroscience and the Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1471, 1488 (1993) ("Skinner actually
elucidated a philosophy as much as a scientific theory.").
91 See Rebecca Dresser, Can Law Survive Cognitive Science?, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS,
Winter/Spring 1991, at 31; see also MARIO BUNGE, THEMIND-BODY PROBLEM: A PSYCHO BIOLOGICAL
APPROACH 5 (1991) ("[D]ualism is not scientifically viable. Hence it is unacceptable to a science-
oriented philosophy.")
92 Lelling, supra note 90, at 1488.
93 B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 200 (1971).
94 GUY R LEFRANCoIs, PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES AND HUMAN LEARNING 70 (2d ed. 1982).
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sensory system, a memory system with short-term and long-term components, and
a response system.95
Cognitive psychology has gone beyond behaviorism in its reliance on a
machine model but only in the sense that the mechanism concerned is far more
sophisticated. Modem cognitive theory moves psychology into the age of robotics.
The human being is essentially pictured as a robot, moving from day to day with
adaptive capacities under the direction of both its hardware and its software
programming, enabling certain mechanical adaptations to be made thanks to its
feedback capabilities. But these adaptations are not actually choices for which the
robot may be held accountable. They are blindly shaped influences, actions that
cannot be opposed or modified to suit intentions framed outside of or in
contradiction to the pre-arranged framing of the hardware and software. As a result,
there is little in this doctrine to support legal theories of responsibility. For
responsibility to attach, it must be possible for a person to choose a proper path over
an improper one. Such final causation is not, however, in the picture when
considering robotic machines 6
V. PSYCHOLOGY AS THE SCIENCE OF EFFICIENT CAUSATION
"[E]xperimental psychology had, by the mid-20th century, been nurturing
a hard-won tradition of disregarding 'inside the organism' speculations in favor of
'observed behavior'." 7 When John Watson asked his psychologist-colleagues to
think of people as "assembled organic machine[s]," 8 he established the starting
point which would shape the psychological research from then on. Watson's theory
was accepted as the initial proposition, and almost all subsequent research on
behavior would be directed toward that end. As one psychologist explained,
95 For typical examples of this kind of theorizing, see HOWARD GARDNER, THE MIND'S NEW
SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE COGNITIVE REVOLUrION (1985); JOHN R. ANDERSON, THE ARCHITECTURE
OF COGNITION (1983); ROBERT S. WYER, JR. & DONALD E. CARLSTON, SOCIAL COGNITION, INFERENCE,
AND ATTRIBUTION (1979).
96 For many arguments along this line, see HUBERT L. DREYFus, WHAT COMPUTERS CAN'T Do:
THE LIMITS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (rev. ed. 1979); HUBERT L. DREYFUS & STUART E. DREYFUS,
MIND OVER MACHINE (1986).
97 LOGICAL LEARNING THEORY, supra note 5, at 67. See also B.F. Skinner, Are Theories of
Learning Necessary?, 57 PSYCHOL. REV. 193 (1950).
99 Watson, supra note 83, at p. 216.
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[E]veryone has been molded by influences which in large measure
at least determine his present behavior; he is literally the product
of these influences, stemming from periods prior to his "years of
discretion," giving him a host of character traits that he cannot
change now even if he would .... An act is free when it is
determined by the man's character, say moralists; but what if the
most decisive aspects of his character were already irrevocably
acquired before he could do anything to mold them? .... What are
we to say of this kind of "freedom?" Is it not rather like the
freedom of the machine to stamp labels on cans when it has been
devised for just that purpose?99
As psychology grew into scientific study, it was positioned solidly on efficient
causation, with a secondary emphasis on material causation (as in drive theories,
which impelled behavior). Final and formal causation were not given serious
consideration. As a result, empirical investigations were designed to prove that
human behavior was exclusively efficiently causal in nature, rather than being
designed to explore all possibilities. This is where the real problem arose.
VI. THE BREAKDOWN OF NEWTONIAN SCIENCE
Newtonian science dominated the field for almost 300 years, and this had
a profound influence on the philosophy of scientific exploration. If scientists expect
a certain result, and especially if they are able to interpret their data so as to fit their
initial assumptions, the philosophy under which they operate can have a dramatic
self-fulfilling impact on their findings. When those conducting the experiments
expected to find a Newtonian clockwork universe, they structured their experiments
to go about proving their theory.
Science begins with the assumption that.., events follow patterns
that are predictable if we just understand the underlying principles.
Physics is the model: If we know the current state of the world and
the laws that take it from its current state to its next state, in each
instant of time, then in principle the world is completely
predictable through all future time. This was the dream of the
great Eighteenth Century physicist Laplace - but, as every dabbler
in popular science knows, Laplace's vision is no longer acceptable.
Chaos theory, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and quantum
99 John Hospers, Free Will and Psychoanalysis, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 463, 465 (H.
Morris ed., 1961).
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mechanics all show that the idea of perfect predictability is wrong,
even in physics. Eminent physicists have constructed theories of
brain and mind that use non-deterministic physics to restore human
free will to the pedestal from which Skinner and other
psychologists appeared to have displaced it."0
During the first thirty years of the twentieth century, classical notions concerning
the nature of physical reality underwent significant revision.' ' The great revolution
in twentieth century physics has come from the recognition that the very nature of
some events is probabilistic and not certain.102 In fact, "theoretical statistics in the
20th century may have been influenced more by indeterminism than by
determinism."1 3 As science has advanced, and quantum mechanics has emerged
as a new science, Newtonian physics has proved to be less than adequate at
explaining the world.'04
100 John Staddon, Freedom From Fear? How belief in a pain-free utopia has discredited
punishment and de-civilized society, THE OXFORD AMERICAN, Spring 1996, at 103-104. Regarding
quantum physics, Niels Bohr wrote, "[w]e are here so far removed from a causal description that an
atom in a stationary state may in general even be said to possess a free choice between various possible
transitions to other stationary states." NIELS BOHR, ATOMIC THEORY AND THE DESCRIPTION OF
NATURE: FOUR ESSAYS WITH AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 109 (1934). Bohr was speaking
metaphorically, but in doing so he was also suggesting that there was something beyond efficient and
material causation at work. Non-telic determinations of events are valuable as postulates in the search
for natural laws, but physical scientists have come to realize that these mechanistic formulations are
mere approximations of the truth; they are incomplete descriptions. See also infra notes 109-I1.
101 Phases of Physics, THE TIMES (LONDON), May 13, 1992, at 13. As scientists pushed the
envelope in their investigations into new areas, "It]he Newtonian, matter-in-motion picture that had
dominated scientific thought for well over 200 years unraveled like an old sweater." Id.
102 Hawking, supra note 85, at 56. See generally ROBERT P. CREASE & CHARLES C. MANN, THE
SECOND CREATION: MAKERS OF THE REVOLUTION IN 20TH-CENTURY PHYSICS 83 (1986).
103 Viney, supra note 82, at 36 (citing THEODORE M. PORTER, THE RISE OF STATISTICAL
THINKING, 1820-1900 (1986)).
104 See Phases of Physics, supra note 101. While Einstein's general theory of relativity
accurately predicts that which Newton's theory of gravity cannot, Newton's theory is nonetheless still
used in "normal" applications, because it "has the great advantage that it is much simpler to work with
than Einstein's!" Hawking, supra note 85, at 10.
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The principle of uncertainty forms one of the cornerstones of modem
physics."0 5 In explaining the complex theory of quantum electrodynamics, the late
Professor Richard Feynman provided an interesting example of uncertainty in
modem physics by describing an experiment to measure the partial reflection of
light by a glass surface." The experimenter focused a light source onto a block of
glass and set up two light receptors, known as photomultipliers. One
photomultiplier measures the number of photons reflected off the glass surface
(receptor A), and the other, imbedded in the glass, measures the number of photons
transmitted by the front surface of the glass (receptor B). The experimenter
observed that "for every 100 photons that go down toward the glass, an average of
four arrive at A and 96 arrive at B. So 'partial reflection' in this case means that
4% of the photons are reflected by the front surface of the glass, while the other
96% are transmitted."'0 7
As Professor Feynman explained, the challenge is to explain this result in
terms of a theory: "how does the photon 'make up its mind' whether it should go
to A or B.' 0 8
Try as we might to invent a reasonable theory that can explain how
a photon "makes up its mind" whether to go through glass or
bounce back, it is impossible to predict which way a given photon
will go .... Here is a circumstance - identical photons are always
coming down in the same direction to the same piece of glass -that
produces different results. We cannot predict whether a given
photon will arrive at A or B. All we can predict is that out of 100
photons that come down, an average of 4 will be reflected by the
front surface. Does this mean that physics, a science of great
105 German physicist and Nobel prize winner Werner Karl Heisenberg is best known for his
formation of the Uncertainty Principle, also called the Principle of Indeterminacy. With this principle
he suggested that it is not possible to specify precisely both the position and velocity of an electron at
any given moment.
When Heisenberg presented his new theory to the world, all of the old, previously accepted
assumptions of determinism could no longer be accepted as fact. One would never be able to
completely predict all reactions as long as it is impossible to measure both position and momentum
precisely. The Heisenberg principle forces the scientist to make a choice between exact position or
exact momentum (or neither being exact) when calculating the uncertainty of an electron. Thus, the
aim of Newtonian science is mathematically unattainable, even in theory.
106 RIcHARD P. FEYNMAN, QED: THE STRANGE THEORY OF LIGHT AND MATrER 17-19 (1985).
107 Id. at 17.
108 Id. at 18.
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exactitude, has been reduced to calculating only the probability of
an event, and not predicting exactly what will happen? Yes.
That's a retreat, but that's the way it is: Nature permits us to
calculate only probabilities.' °9
Similarly, even though our understanding of the orbits of the planets in our solar
system is quite sophisticated, calculating the minute variations in those orbits still
remains beyond the grasp of present day scientists and their computers."0
Nor did Newtonian scientists acknowledge that they, as observers, were
actually participating in the process and that their precedent assumptions influenced
and limited what they would discover."' The Newtonian scientists took the
position that they could view reality without a presumptive bias. If they had
recognized the extent to which they were participating in the process and
influencing what they would eventually discover,"' they would also have realized
that they could never predict the future in a one hundred percent efficient cause
way:
Quantum mechanics appears to destroy the basic fabric of causality
and to confuse the position of the observer with what is being
observed; relativity overthrows the absolutism of Newtonian time
and space, revealing them to be a single continuum which curves
and loops through the universe; chaos theory reveals the linearity
109 Id at 19. The uncertainty associated with an individual photon's behavior has been likened
to uncertainty associated with an individual person's behavior. See William Stephenson, Quantum
Theory and Q-Methodology: Fictionalistic and Probabilistic Theories Conjoined, 33 PSYCHOL. REC.
213, 215-217 (1983) (discussing the parallels between quantum theory and factor theories in
psychology). Niels Bohr, speaking metaphorically, even wrote of the "free choice" of the atom to
organize itself from one steady state to another. BOHR, supra note 100, at 109.
This discussion of the photon as possessing the ability to decide confounds the extraspective
with the introspective. See Brewer, supra note 42. Material and efficient causation are suited to
extraspective (third person) explanations, while formal and final causation are suited to introspective
(first person) formulations. Unless the photon is speaking, the language of final causation makes little
sense.
110 Isaac Newton's description of the difficulty posed in calculating the interactions of the
planets has been likened to the problems posed in studying human behavior. GLEIK, supra note 55,
at 7.
111 ILYA PRIGOGINE & ISABELLE STENGERS, ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: MAN'S NEW DIALOGUE WITH
NATURE 218, 224-225 (1984); GARY ZUKAV, THE DANCING WU LI MASTERS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
NEW PHYSICS 29 (1979).
112 PRIGOGINE & STENGERS, supra note 111, at 218, 224, 225; ZUKAV, supra note 11, at 29.
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of classical mathematics as a seriously deficient model of the real
world. In short, the message of all three theories is: classical
science is wrong insofar as it claims to be a final interpretation of
reality."'
Here we have scientific evidence of a chance factor in chemical and physical
reactions. Formal-cause patterns remain, some of which are probabilistic (or
statistical), but one cannot - even in principle - find the efficient causes of these
patterns.
VII. DOES PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE REALLY SERVE THE LAW?
Behavioristic psychologists use the scientific method in their work in hopes
of removing any possibility that concepts of purpose or intention will contaminate
their empirical observations. Their starting assumption of people as machines,
however, taints their work. This is not to say that their work is entirely without
merit, but the results must be evaluated in light of current knowledge that the initial
bias of even a well-meaning observer can corrupt the outcome. With psychology
so firmly rooted in non-telic Newtonian determinism, these findings are particularly
subject to scrutiny.
A scientist observes behavior (or the results of experiments), relates what
he or she can explain based upon that observation, and accepts as uncertain what
remains. The reason for this uncertainty may be interpreted as free will,
randomness, or something else."4  This reason, however, is not a scientific
conclusion; it is at most an informed guess from an extraspective point of view.
Such a guess is not sufficient to fit the needs of the legal system, which examines
people from their introspective points of view."5 To the law, the reason for
behavior matters a great deal. It is not sufficient to attribute some behavior to
uncertainty.
An extraspective (i.e., impersonal or third-person) point of view cannot
reveal the inner motivation of the person being tested. Information gathered with
such an experiment is even one step further removed from explaining the behavior
of other people not under study. A scientist conducting such tests can point to
113 PRIGOGINE & STENGERS, supra note 111, at 218, 224, 225; see also Robert Pool, Was
Newton Wrong?, ScIENCE, August 12, 1988, at 789 (examining Newton's theory of gravity in light of
possible extra component of gravity).
14 See GLEICK, supra note 55, at 251 (discussing determinism and free will in relation to
modem physics).
115 Hence the concern with mens rea. See supra notes 18-24.
1997]
27
Rychlak and Rychlak: Mental Health Experts on Trial: Free Will and Determinism in the
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1997
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
material- and efficient-cause explanations (determinations) of how a given influence
shaped behavior. The scientist cannot, however, see or measure formal- and final-
cause determinations. As such, aberrations or variances in expected behavior are
attributed to randomness instead of will.
Because the scientist has not tested or studied the issue of will, when it
comes to judgments about introspective behavior, a layperson's judgment is as valid
as that of a scientific expert."6 Ajuror can assess whether certain impulses or urges
are a matter of will because the juror - like the legal system - assumes that will,
self-determination or final causation exist. Unless ihe expert operates under a
similar assumption, he or she can offer no "expert" testimony on the central issue
that the court is trying to resolve. Yet, courts too often accept "expert" testimony
on such issues.
If the Baconian Criticism holds true, Newtonian science cannot be used to
explain human behavior, and those theories that rely on such science (in particular,
behaviorism and reductionism), must be rethought. Why then are so many modem
psychological studies based on the efficient and material-cause model, and why do
courts continue to admit expert evidence based on scientific evidence that does not
- even in theory - address the central issue that the court needs to resolve? To
understand this (and to be able to formulate sustainable objections to such
testimony), one must look to the development of these theories of behavior.
Psychological experts have evidence to support their theories. In fact, the
efficient cause school claims that it "relies heavily on empirical validation." ' As
these theories were developed, psychologists conducted experiments to support
their views on behavioral reinforcement. There are, however, serious questions
about the validity of these experiments.'
A host of empirical work was done over the first half of the twentieth
century in which initially lower animals and later human beings were studied using
relatively simple, concrete tasks that lent themselves to efficient cause description
116 See JAMEs Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABusE ExcuSE T-REATEN OUR LEGAL
SYSTEM? 90 (1997) ("When ajury judges a defendant, it considers his or her mental state only to the
extent necessary to establish the existence of one or another of a small list of excusing or justifying
defenses, such as insanity, necessity, or self-defense. But when ajury explains the defendant's actions,
it searches for a full account of the factors - the motives, circumstances, and beliefs - that caused
them.").
117 Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology ofDeterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115,151
(citing G. Terence Wilson, Behavior Therapy, in CuRRENT PsYcHoTHERAPIEs 241,258-260 (Raymond
J. Corsini et al. eds., 4th ed. 1989).
118 The argument is not that because only I can feel my pain, only I can diagnose my own illness
or injury. The argument is that the doctor trying to diagnose me must acknowledge that there is such
a thing as pain.
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and analysis. The founder of Connectionism, Edward L. Thorndike, studied cats to
see how long it took them to find their way out of a puzzle box in which various
rings could be pulled to gain release. 9 John Watson, studied white rats, 20 as did
his followers, Edward C. Tolman and Clark L. Hull.' The rats, who were denied
food or water for considerable periods of time, were placed in various types of
mazes and then timed to see how quickly they could reach rewards (reinforcements)
at a goal box. Over repeated trials in these boxes or mazes it was found that the
animals' performance improved." This was taken as proof that learning was
merely a question of frequently repeated responses, encouraged in some cases by
the physical drive to gain nourishment. Although Tolman made a stab at explaining
purpose in terms of observed improvement on a task,"z none of these behavioral
theories deviated from the assumption that behavior was exclusively efficiently
caused.
When the succeeding generation of behaviorists began administering such
experimental tasks to humans, they continued explaining the behavior of a person
as if a machine were being studied - a free-standing object that was constituted of
parts moving in a well-oiled, efficient cause manner. The point of view of the
person being studied by an experimenter was not considered relevant to what
transpired in the conditioning process. In the same way that the animals had been
viewed as nothing more than experimental apparatus, the introspective viewpoints
of human experimental participants were also ignored. These people were treated
as if they were objects, lacking the capacity to influence what took place through
personal choice or purposeful intention. Conditioning theories kept the human
being trapped within this mechanistic image of humanity. Behavior was behavior,
and it moved thorough efficient causation up and down the Darwinian ladder of
living organisms.'24
119 See generally EDWARD L. THORNDiKE, AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF REWARDS (1993).
120 See generally JOHN B. WATSON, BEHAVIORISM (1924).
121 See EDWARD C. TOLMAN, PURPOSIVE BEHAVIOR IN ANIMALS AND MEN (1932); See also
CLARK L. HULL, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR (1943).
122 See GLEITMAN, supra note 83, at 78.
123 TOLMAN, supra notel 19, at 421-23.
124 JOSEPH F. RYCHLAK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RIGOROUS HUMANISM 226-273 (2d ed. 1988).
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Fortunately, a few psychologists were willing to challenge the narrow
interpretation that behaviorism was giving to conditioning theory. 25 As these
psychologists conducted their research on the conditioning phenomenon, the
behaviorists' confident belief in efficient causation as the sole cause of behavior
was brought into question.
When human beings (as opposed to animals) are used to study conditioning
it becomes possible to study things from their viewpoint. Those conducting the
experiments can ask the subjects about their conditioning experience. Interviews
can be conducted with people following the tests, including those subjects who have
performed in an operant-conditioning format.26 This interviewing process shifts
the psychologist's theoretical perspective from an extraspective (third person) slant
to an introspective (first person) position. Explanations of "him, her, that, and it"
change to explanations of "I, me, we and us."
As this interviewing process was gradually perfected, it threw an entirely
new light onto the understanding of what it means to shape behavior through
conditioning. 27 In ninety percent of the experiments conducted over several years,
conditioning was found to be a cooperative venture in which the person being
"shaped" had to (1) grasp what was taking place in the experimental format, and (2)
willingly comply with what this format required or demanded. If these two
requirements were not met, actual conditioning was rarely demonstrated.'
The person in an operant-conditioning study has to "catch on" to the
experiment if he or she is going to be conditioned. People who have been
conditioned are routinely able to verbalize that "every time I say this one type of
word [for example, an adjective or a plural noun] the experimenter says 'mm hmm,'
125 L. Douglas DeNike, The Temporal Relationship Between Awareness and Performance in
Verbal Conditioning, 68 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 521-529 (1964); DONELSON E. DULANEY,
AWARENESs, RULES, AND PROPOSITIONAL CONTROL: A CONFRONTATION WITH S-R BEHAVIOR THEORY
IN VERBAL BEHAVIOR AND GENERAL BEHAVIOR THEORY 340-3 87 (T.R. Dison and D.L. Horton eds.,
1968); Monte M. Page, Demand Characteristics and the Verbal Operant Conditioning Experiment,
23 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 372-378 (1972).
126 Joel Greenspoon, The Reinforcing Effect of Two Spoken Sounds on the Frequency of Tvo
Responses, 68 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 409-416 (1955).
127 L. Douglas DeNike, The Temporal Relationship Between Awareness and Performance in
Verbal Conditioning, 68 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 521-529 (1964); Charles D. Spielberger et al.,
Conditioning of Verbal Behavior as a Function of Awareness, Need for Social Approval, and
Motivation to Receive Reinforcement, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 241-246 (1963); Donelson
E. Dulany, An Analysis of Verbal Control in Verbal Conditioning, in BEHAVIOR AND AWARENESS: A
SYMPOSIUM OF RESEARCH AND INTERPRETATION 102-129 (Charles W. Eriksen ed., 1962).
128 See Brewer, supra note 42, at 1-41.
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so that must be what I should keep on saying." Or, in a classical-conditioning
format in which a person is being conditioned to blink his or her eyes to a flashing
light, the person may observe, "every time that light flashes a puff of air is blown
into my eye, making me blink." These subjects figure out what is taking place and,
even though they could negate the process, go along with experimental demands.129
If the person who is being conditioned lacks this awareness, it is very difficult, if
not impossible, to condition behavior.30 Furthermore, even when people know
what is going on in the conditioning format, they are occasionally found to be
uncooperative. They simply refuse to "get conditioned" and "play the game" as
good experimental participants should do.'
With these findings on awareness, it becomes difficult to characterize
conditioning as a matter of efficient causation. The participants in this research are
conscious of what is going on, and they make a decision as to whether to play along
with the experimental instructions. They are behaving for the sake of a personal
choice, and such behaviors are only truly captured by using the telic terminology
of formal and especially final causation.
The efficient cause machine model does not work to explain such behavior,
because a scientist would not have to obtain a machine's cooperation to get it to
work properly. Although the reinforcement concept is still widely used, and non-
specialists still tend to believe that conditioning involves a blind shaping of
behavior, current research literature indicates otherwise. Modem researchers speak
of expectancy and predictability in the conditioning formats.' Concepts such as
these are future oriented and purposive, and highly consistent with teleology.
Conditioning itself has been redefined by a leading theoretician as "the process
whereby when an animal is exposed to certain relationships between events,
representations (i.e., cognitive images) of those events are formed, and associations
established between them, with the consequence that the animal's behaviour [sic]
129 I.E. Farber, The Things People Say to Themselves, 18 Am. Psychol. 185-197 (1963).
130 See Brewer, supra note 42, at 1-41.
131 Monte M. Page, Demand Characteristics and the Verbal Operant Conditioning Experiment,
23 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 372-378 (1972).
132 Allan R. Wagner, Expectancies and the Priming of STM, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN
ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 177-209 (Stewart H. Hulse et al. eds., 1978); Robert A. Rescorla, Informational
Variables in Pavlovian Conditioning, in 6 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION:
ADVANCES INRESEARCHANDTHEORY (Gordon H. Bower ed., 1972) at 1-46; Robert A. Rescorla, Some
Implications of a Cognitive Perspective on Pavlovian Conditioning, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN
ANIMAL BEHAVIOR, supra, at 15-50.
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changes in certain specifiable ways."'3 This definition could easily accommodate
the concepts of intention and purpose if understood from the first-person
(introspective) perspective of an actor carrying out mental formulations. By adding
the findings on the capacity of choice within the conditioning format, a free will
concept is easily accommodated. Behaviorism is no longer riveted to the
mechanistic position by empirical research findings. Unfortunately, most of today's
psychologists and psychiatrists still are riveted to the mechanistic position. This
includes most of those who are called before the court as expert witnesses.
A. Efficient Cause Determinism Has Led the Law Astray
Because the mechanistic determinists in psychology hold themselves out
to be "tough-minded" scientists, courts often look to them for guidance in matters
of mental health and personal responsibility. Behaviorist experts do not, however,
begin from the same initial premise that the courts do. They do not even study
final-cause concepts. Thus, lawyers ask the expert to give an opinion as to whether
the defendant acted out of his or her free will or due to some outside influence (that
might excuse the behavior), when the behaviorist as a core proposition of his or her
theory believes that all behavior is shaped by external forces. Lawyers want the
psychologist to say whether the act in question was an exercise of free will, but the
behaviorist rejects the very notion of free will. Adoption of the behaviorist model
has led to situations where legal doctrine has been modified to accommodate
shifting psychological understandings." 4 The most obvious situation relates to the
development of the insanity defense." 5 The original M'Naghten Rule,3 6 was
133 NICHOLAS JOHN MACKINTOSH, CONDITIONING AND ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING 20 (1983).
134 In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1957), is commonly known as the "weekend flip
flop case," because on Friday the defendant, diagnosed as a sociopath, was not suffering from a mental
disease according to a psychiatrist from St. Elizabeth's Hospital. Over the weekend, however, the
hospital decided - as an administrative matter- that a sociopath should be classified as suffering from
a mental disease. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F. 2d 969, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (describing the
"flip flop").
135 See, e.g., Rychlak & Rychlak, supra note 60. According to Blackstone, "idiots and lunatics
are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under these capacities: no, not even for
treason itself." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-25 (1765) ('furiosis furore solem
punitun" - "a madman is punished by his madness alone").
136 For a full discussion of the origins of this rule, see Rychlak & Rychlak, supra note 60, at 9-
12.
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modified by the irresistible impulse test,13 7 to ease the concerns of
psychopathologists of that era that the original rule was overly "intellectual" in its
assessment of the circumstances of mental illness.'38 These early mental health
experts, who were theorizing based upon material- and efficient-cause
determinations in biological reductionism, complained that anyone who dealt with
the inmates of an insane asylum could readily establish that these patients usually
knew the quality of their acts, and the rightness or wrongness of their acts, but that
they could still not control themselves.' The irresistible impulse test permitted
these experts to offer opinions relating to the material- and efficient-cause
influences that "shaped" the behavior of their patients.
Later, one court framed an insanity decision that most leading
psychopathologists favored for similar reasons. The key section read as follows:
The rule we now hold . . . is simply that an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect.
We use "disease" in the sense of a condition which is
considered capable of either improving or deteriorating. We use
"defect" in the sense of a condition which is not considered
capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may be
congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a
physical or mental disease. 4
Under this test, behavioristically-oriented psychopathologists did not have to
answer a simple yes or no to the question "Did the defendant know the difference
between right and wrong at the time of his or her offensive act?" This test
permitted the psychopathologist to frame background considerations in rendering
a judgment as to the mental state of the defendant. It was then up to the jury to
decide whether these background considerations were of sufficient proportion to
produce (via causal determinations of one sort or another) the actus reus, and
137 See Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 866 (Al.a. 1887).
138 Rychlak & Rychlak, supra note 60, at 11.
139 Id.
140 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (emphasis added).
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thereby excuse the defendant from criminal responsibility. 4' Subsequent
modifications to the insanity defense have been similarly shaped by evolving views
of human nature. 42
Recently, efficient cause determinants have been urged as possible defenses
to criminal cases even though they do not claim to rise to the level of insanity.'43
Thus, narcotics addiction has been urged as a defense to both narcotics crimes, 44
and to other crimes driven by the need to support the addiction;' 45 chronic
alcoholism has been raised as a defense to crimes involving public drunkenness; 4
and compulsive gambling has been raised as a defense to theft offenses.
47
Developing these arguments further, defendants have claimed defenses such as the
cultural evidence defense, battered spouse defense, mob defense, Black rage
defense, urban psychosis, steroid-induced psychosis, anti-abortion psychosis, and
141 Rychlak & Rychlak, supra note 60, at 12; see also WISON, supra note 116, at 37
("Psychologists liked the [Durham] decision; now there was virtually no criminal trial in which their
testimony would not be relevant.").
142 Id at 13-15.
143 In criminal law, the Battered Woman's defense has been generally well received by the
courts, see, e.g., State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1989), other such theories are still in
their infancy. See also United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1984) (pathological gambling
defense asserted without success); Grossman, Postpartum Psychosis - A Defense to Criminal
Responsibility or JustAnother Gimmick?, 67 U. Det. L. Rev. 311 (1990); Davidson, Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder: A Controversial Defense for Veterans of a Controversial War, 29 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 415, 421 (1988).
144 United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (plurality opinion), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 980 (1973); People v. Davis, 306 N.E.2d 787, (N.Y. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 973
(1974).
145 Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 383 N.E.2d 1115 (1978).
146 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
147 United States v. Tomiero, 735 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 169 U.S. 1110 (1985);
United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Llewellyn, 723 F.2d 615 (8th Cir.
1983). In Lomonaco v. Sands Hotel Casino and Country Club, 614 A.2d 634, 638 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1992), the plaintiff alleged that his behavior during the visit to the casino put the casino on
notice that he suffered from a gambling addiction, and that casino employees exerted sufficient
psychological pressure to override his free will. Id. at 635. For a listing of other such defenses, see
WILSON, supra note 116, at 23.
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financial, emotional, and work-related pressure syndrome.48 At least one author
has argued that evidence of a defendant's personal history, including cultural
background, should play a role in the criminal trial, because individuals are subject
to so many varying environmental, family, and societal influences that they cannot
be held wholly responsible for their criminal actions.149
Efficient causation is even beginning to have some important ramifications
outside of the criminal law area. For example, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 50 the plaintiff claimed, and the Third Circuit agreed, that nicotine addiction
can supply the causation element necessary for a tort cause of action.15' In Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons v. McGuire, the plaintiffs claimed that manufacturers and
148 Rachel J. Littman, Adequate Provocatiorn Individual Responsibility, and the Deconstruction
Of Free Will, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1162 (1997) (discussing these defenses); Note, Feasibility and
Admissibility of Mob Mentality Defenses, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1111, 1112-13 (1995) (discussing the
argument that defendants are less blameworthy due to participation in group criminal activity);
Kimberly M. Copp, Black Rage: The Illegitimacy of a Criminal Defense, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
205, 207 (1995); See John McQuiston, Jury Finds Ferguson Guilty of Slaying on the L.I.R., N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1995, at I (discussing the Colin Ferguson trial and the "Black rage" defense); Junda
Woo, Urban Trauma Mitigates Guilt, Defenders Say, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1993, at B1, B7; see
generally Rogers Worthington, "Urban Psychosis" Rejected as Slaying Defense, CHI. TR1B., Nov. 5,
1992 (jurors rejecting the urban psychosis defense in a murder trial); JAMES GARBARINO ET AL.,
CHILDREN IN DANGER: COPING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE 1-21, 67-99
(1992) (discussing the danger in exposing children to community violence and how it relates to
post-traumatic stress disorder).
149 Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men:
Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 445-449,
477-480 (1994-95) (discussing the theory and use of cultural defenses); id. 458 n.121 (arguing that
free will should be determined according to a law and society based spectrum).
150 893 F.2d 541, 563 n.19 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that if a plaintiff can show that he or she
became addicted to nicotine as a result of smoking, then ajury can consider the effects of cigarettes
smoked after addiction when determining whether a tobacco company's "conduct proximately caused
[a plaintiff's] lung cancer"). See Alan Schwartz, Views ofAddiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 VA. L.
REV. 509 (1989). Perhaps the most interesting case in this area is that of Castano v. American
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). In this case, the trial court originally certified a plaintiff
class that would have included all nicotine-addicted persons in the United States, regardless of any
cause (or influence) other than the efficient cause influence of smoking a cigarette. See T. Dean
Malone, Comment, Castano v. American Tobacco Co. and Beyond: The Propriety of Certifying
Nationwide Mass-Tort Class Actions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 When the Basis of the
Suit Is a "Novel" Claim or Injury, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 817 (1997).
151 At least one jury returned a verdict against the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation
based upon the suppression of information concerning nicotine addiction. See Suein L. Hwang et al.,
Jury's Tobacco Verdict Suggests Tough Times Ahead for the Industry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1996,
at Al, A4 (reporting $ 750,000 verdict by Florida jury for smoker with lung cancer).
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distributors of alcohol have a duty to warn consumers that they may "develop[] the
disease of alcoholism" through "excessive consumption."'52  And the recent
settlement of actions brought by state governments seeking recovery of Medicaid
expenditures on behalf of smokers is also based upon the idea of an efficient cause
determinism overcoming the free will of individuals.'53
B. Challenges to Free Will
Most social scientists take it for granted that if strict efficient cause
determinism is true (i.e., if everything is completely determined by its antecedents
in strict accord with universal, efficiently caused laws), then there is no free will.
Because they have put their faith in the non-telic theory of "hard" determinism, they
attempt to discredit final causation, by calling it "folk psychology" or
"suppositional science." '54 Thus, one critic of the free will model has written that
"the legal structure of liability cannot be more sound than its philosophical
foundations. And these foundations - insofar as they comprise the idea of free will
- are notoriously shaky." ' As another has argued, "Wherever the concept of free
will is offered as an explanation, the scientist must entertain a suspicion that 'the
particular go' of the thing in question is yet to be discovered."'56
Despite claims to the contrary, social scientists have not put together a
convincing case against free will. Empirical findings used to support the efficient-
and material-cause explanations of behavior are subject to interpretations that are
fully consistent with the free will model. In fact, many behavioristically-oriented
experts have recognized the shortcomings of non-telic deterministic theories, but
152 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 814 S.W.2d at 385.
153 At least 14 states have sued the cigarette industry. See Tobacco Shares Lead Drop as Dow
Falls 31.44 Points, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1996, at D6. For discussion of one such suit brought by the
state of Florida, see Richard N. Pearson, The Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, 46 FLA. L.
REV. 609 (1995).
'S4 See, e.g., Lelling, supra note 90, at 1473 ("the psychological theory motivating our
assignments of blame is not an outgrowth of sober research, but the culmination of thousands of years
of unquestioned supposition.").
155 Dan-Cohen, supra note 11, at 960.
156 Viney, supra note 82, at 32; see also Committee on Psychiatry and the Law, Group for the
Advancement of Psychiatry, Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatric Expert Testimony, in BY REASON
OF INSANITY: ESSAYS ON PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 3, 10 (Lawrence Z. Freedman ed., 1983)
("Attacks upon the law by psychiatrists and the defense of the legal system by lawyers have engaged
a disproportionate share of our attention and exertions .... ).
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they nevertheless have clung to their beliefs in this model even when the science
would seem to go the other way.157 As one of them has explained, "most behavioral
scientists would probably agree that the assumption that there is free will when in
fact there is none, results in more damage than the assumption that there is no free
will when in fact there is some."'58 The use of assumptions, however, undermines
the science. Too often, behavioral scientists simply avoid this very important issue.
C. Ignoring the Free Will Issue
One way to avoid confronting the shortcomings of the efficient- and
material-cause model of human behavior is by ignoring the free will issue
altogether, at least when it comes to matters involving the legal system. "Legal
scholars usually have either chosen to ignore this question or, in what amounts to
the same thing, have posited 'free will' for legal purposes."'59 Thus, they argue that
legal decisions should not be burdened with considerations of free will.16
Similarly, it has been suggested that "the law treats man's conduct as autonomous
and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed as if it were."''
Such an approach has even been expressed by the United States Supreme Court:
How far one by an exercise of free will may determine his general
destiny or his course in a particular matter and how far he is the toy
of circumstance has been debated through the ages by theologians,
philosophers, and scientists. Whatever doubts they have
entertained as to the matter, the practical business of government
and administration of the law is obliged to proceed on more or less
rough and ready judgments based on the assumption that mature
and rational persons are in control of their own conduct ....
157 Einstein, for instance, knew that the science of his day was at odds with the deterministic
model, but he believed that the science would one day be corrected and fit with the deterministic
model. LEWIS S. FEUER, EINSTEIN AND THE GENERATIONS OF SCIENCE 83-84 (1974).
158 Viney, supra note 82, at 40.
159 Christopher Slobogin, A Rational Approach to Responsibility, 83 MICH. L. REv. 820, 820
(1985) (reviewing MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP (1984);
see also WILSON, supra note 116, at 40 (referring to free will as a "convenient fiction").
160 As one legal commentator put it, "[o]ne way of reconciling the apparent tension between
the scientific and the legal view of persons is to jettison the notion of retributive justice." Slobogin,
supra note 159, at 821.
161 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74-75 (1968).
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Whether or not this assumption squares with philosophical
doctrine, or even with reality, is not for our determination.'
More recently, the Court wrote, "[h]appily, our task is not to resolve the
philosophical meaning of free will, but to determine [Congressional intent]."'63
Legal responsibility, however, is certainly tied to the issue of free will.
Criminal actions, for example, are filed and prosecuted by the state, not an
aggrieved individual. The goal of a criminal prosecution is not to restore the
injured party, but to punish the violator." The typical remedy is imposition of a
fine or incarceration of the wrongdoer. Such punishment is justifiable if the
wrongdoer freely decided to commit the bad act. Punishment is hard to justify if the
person is little more than a robot propelled along in an efficient- and material-cause
manner.
One theory which purports to ignore personal responsibility is what has
been called a "dangerousness" analysis. If we decide not to require personal
blameworthiness, punishment can be premised on the need to prevent future crime
by the individual in question.6 Judge Richard Posner, of the United States Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, has argued that as societies' legal systems mature,
criminal responsibility becomes increasingly "external."'66 In other words, mature
systems attach criminal liability more as a matter of conduct than of intent, with
criminals eventually likened to "unreasonably dangerous machines."'67 Under this
theory, the law does not require a "concept of mind in which intentions and free will
162 Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1942) (footnote omitted).
163 United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 959 (1988).
164 GEORGE FLETCHER, REHqING CRIMINAL LAW 409 (1978) ("As a test for when processes
are criminal, the Supreme Court unhesitatingly invokes the concept of 'punishment' as the relevant
criterion."). See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (Illinois "Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act" found not criminal in nature because it is not aimed at punishment).
165 See generally KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968); B. WOOTTON, CRIME
AND PENAL POLICY 220-39 (1978). A significant practical problem associated with this approach is
the difficulty in predicting dangerousness. See generally JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 21-67 (1981).
166 See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 168-169 (1990).
167 Id. at 168. Judge Posner refers to Holmes, citing the diminishing role of mental states in
light of advancing scientific knowledge as a "major theme" of that work. Id.
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figure."'68 Instead, what a person intends to do is equated with what it is rational
for that individual to do, 69 and consideration of mental states is removed from the
explanation of behavior. 70 The law thereby becomes an "instrument of social
control,"''M designed to guide rational people along the path of acceptable behavior.
Ultimately, Posner's theory fails to provide a meaningful explanation of
behavior because it either "envisions some brute, external force dictating the actions
of persons' bodies, [or it] implicitly relies on beliefs and desires.""7 Of course,
when beliefs and fears are brought into play, mental states must also be involved.
As such, this theory simply acts as if there were no free will, despite any evidence
to the contrary.
Some people have tried to accommodate both mechanistic determinism and
free will responsibility. Thus it has been argued that psychological explanations for
behavior do not negate free will or excuse responsibility. 74 In other words, just
because the behavior was predicted according to the deterministic theory, it does not
necessarily follow that the actor was not a free moral agent who may justly be held
responsible.' This approach argues that caused behavior is not necessarily
compelled behavior, and that caused behavior is not excused simply because it is
caused.'76 Sheldon Glueck was a proponent of the degree-determinist continuum.'
He found it helpful to imagine a chart which showed the freedom/determinism
proportions of different people, in which the freedom reflected behavior of a
168 See id. at 176.
169 See id. at 170.
170 Id. at 173.
171 POSNER, supra note 166, at 176. This might be considered a formal-cause of behavior.
172 Lelling, supra note 90, at 1536.
173 Id. ("Posner is unsuccessful in his attempt to explain the law without mental state attributions
because he relies on a concept of deterrence entailing beliefs and fears.").
174 Stephen J. Morse, Psychology, Determinism, and Legal Responsibility in NEBRASKA
SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION: THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORIAL INSTRU ENT, 35, 45-58 (Gary B. Melton
ed., 1985).
17S Id. at 46.
176 Id.
177 See S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: COLD WAR OR ENTENTE CORDIALE? (1962).
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formal/fial cause nature and determinism reflected behavior of a material/efficient-
cause nature. With this proportional array we might then speculate that a
feebleminded person's freedom/determinism mix might consist of ten percent
endowed intelligent free-choosing capacity, and ninety percent predetermined
blocking of freedom, choice, and control. Glueck set his baseline for responsibility
at the "free-choosing capacity of the 'average, reasonable' or 'prudent' abstract
standard man of the law [which] will range, let us say, between 50 and 65 percent,
leaving a 50 to 35 percent quantum of solid-line dominance." 78 Norval Morris also
claimed that there were "degree[s] of freedom of choice on a continuum.'I'1
These half-way theories all seem to leave room for final (free-will)
causation, resulting in what has been termed a "soft determinism" as opposed to the
hard determinisms of the mechanists."8 ° Even so, these are minority positions.
Most psychological and psychiatric professionals are so steeped in the traditions of
hard (efficient cause) determinism that they are unwilling to undertake a serious
consideration of the scientific evidence in support of free will.' Yet, strong,
scientifically based evidence does exist.
178 Id. at 12-13.
179 NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMi NAL LAW 61 (1982). Of course, others have
argued that "[i]t makes sense to say that we are determined or that we are free, but to speak of being
partly determined or partly free makes as much sense as to speak of being partly pregnant." Moore,
supra note 16, at 1115-16.
180 Rachel J. Littman, Adequate Provocation, Individual Responsibility, and the Deconstruction
ofFree Will, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1127, 1131 (1997); John Lawrence Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 631, 670 n.231 (1994); Michael Corrado, Automatism and the Theory ofAction, 39 EMORY L.
J. 1191, 1202 (1990).
181 For a recent statement by one of today's leading criminal law theorists reflecting the
dominant theory in the mental health sciences, see WILSON, supra note 116, at 39.
One can concede - indeed, if one is an especially ambitious social scientist, one
will proclaim - that all human behavior is [efficiently] caused. That is to say, if
one knew enough about the antecedent conditions of a given act, one could
completely explain that act .... For example, if I strike your knee in a certain
place with a small hammer, your leg will jerk upward. The patellar reflex is an
involuntary act based on a heritable disposition. Things get a good deal more
complicated when we attempt to explain intentional thought, speech, and social
behavior. But there is no reason to think that these actions are any less caused
than the patellar reflex. If we knew enough about my genetic endowment and
childhood socialization, the opportunities and incentives available to me, we could
fully explain why I am sitting here writing this chapter.
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VIII. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM
The consistent findings that awareness and cooperation are fundamental to
the "shaping" of behavior through conditioning suggests that the person under study
is not a mere pawn being manipulated by external forces in efficient cause
fashion.' Rather, the person is a freely-willing agent, capable of furthering what
is being indicated or opposing it. Evidence for free will in such research is
apparent, but it is rarely analyzed by psychologists who conduct these experiments.
As such, expert witnesses who rely on this testing as a core premise of their science
either flatly reject agency in human behavior or are confused about how such self-
determination can take place."3 How then can such "experts" assist the court in
evaluating ethical dilemmas?
Traditionally, if the science underlying the evidence at issue were
"generally accepted" by the relevant scientific community as being accurate and
reliable, the evidence would be admissible. This standard evolved from the case of
Frye v. United States,&$ and has been known as the Frye Test or Frye Rule. Under
this approach, evidence based upon novel scientific or technical processes would
be admissible only if it had been "sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."'85
In 1993, the Supreme Court handed down the decision of Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,8 ' in which the Court ruled that the Federal
Rules of Evidence superseded Frye. The Court quoted the Federal Rules, which
provide that all logically relevant evidence is admissible "except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these
182 See supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
183 See Committee on Psychiatry and the Law, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry,
Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatric Expert Testimony, in BY REASON OF INSANITY: ESSAYS ON
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 3, 10 (Lawrence Z. Freedman ed., 1983) (testifying experts often fail to
recognize the requirements of the law); COMMENTARY: CRmIMNAL RESPONSIBILITY, IN PSYCHIATRISTS
AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: DIAGNOSIS & DEBATE 97-98 (Richard J. Bonnie ed., 1977) ("[T]he spirit of
the law is frequently frustrated when cases go to trial on the insanity plea .... Psychiatrists and
defense attorneys have simply not devoted to these cases the time and attention necessary to transcend
the disciplinary boundaries and to translate clinical materials into terms that will be understandable and
useful to the ultimate decision makers -judges and juries.").
184 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
185 Id. at 1014. See also RONALD J. RYCHLAK, DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE: APPLICATIONS AND
THEORY 417-418 (1995 & Supp. 1997) [hereinafter DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE].
186 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority."'87 The Court ultimately concluded that the Frye standard is "absent
from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence . *...""' In summary,
with respect to "scientific evidence," the trial court must make a preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically reliable and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts at issue." 9
Trial courts have a "screening" or "gatekeeping" role to assure the scientific
reliability and validity of the reasoning or methodology underlying the expert's
testimony and to assure that unreliable evidence will not be admitted. Under this
new standard, the trial court must undertake a two pronged inquiry. The first prong
is that the evidence must assist the trier of fact. "Expert testimony which does not
relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful."'90 In general,
this first prong adds little to the basic requirement of relevancy for admissibility.
The Court did, however, note that since expert evidence can be both powerful and
misleading, the judge, in weighing possible prejudice against probative value under
Rule 403, exercises more control over expert witnesses than over lay witnesses.'9 '
The second prong is the new part of the test. The evidence must amount to
"scientific knowledge." In order to constitute "scientific knowledge," the evidence
must derive from the scientific method, that is, it must be supported by appropriate
scientific validation.
The subject of an expert's testimony must be "scientific ...
knowledge." The adjective "scientific" implies a grounding in the
methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word
"knowledge" connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation. The term "applies to any body of known facts or to
187 FED. R. EviD. 402.
188 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
189 The Daubert decision was based on the language of the Federal Rules, not a constitutional
principle. As such, this case is controlling only in federal court, but it should also be highly persuasive
in those states which have adopted the federal rules or have independently enacted rules similar to
Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 702. By mid-1993, thirty-five states had adopted evidence codes
patterned directly after the Federal Rules of Evidence. See also DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE supra
note 185, at 418-423.
190 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (quoting 3 WEINSTEIN&BERGER 702[02], at. 702-718).
191 Id. at 595.
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any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on
good grounds."''
The main thrust is no longer to establish that the proposition is generally accepted
in the expert's discipline."9 Instead, the goal now must be to show sound scientific
procedure. "The focus ... must be solely on principles and methodology, not on
the conclusions that they generate.' ' 4
While Daubert affirms the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules, the
admissibility standard for new scientific evidence will not necessarily be more
liberal in every case. Daubert makes it possible to introduce testimony about novel
scientific theories that probably would have been barred under Frye. Daubert,
however, may also require a more extensive foundation than was necessary under
Frye. An attorney can no longer simply elicit conclusory testimony that the
overwhelming majority of the specialists in a given field subscribe to a given
proposition. Instead, under Daubert, the court must require evidence relating to the
scientific methodology used to verify the scientific hypothesis and show that it is
empirically sound. Of course, once general acceptance stops being the exclusive
test for admissibility, even seemingly well accepted scientific propositions are no
longer immune from attack.195
192 Id. at 589-590.
193 Id. at 588. According to the Supreme Court, Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 does not
incorporate the "general acceptance" test of Frye:
Nothing in the text of this Rule [702] establishes "general acceptance" as an
absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear
indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a
"general acceptance" standard. The drafting history makes no mention of Frye,
and a rigid "general acceptance" requirement would be at odds with the "liberal
thrust" of the Federal Rules and their "general approach of relaxing the traditional
barriers to opinion testimony."
Id.
194 Id. at 594.
DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE, supra note 185, at 423.
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IX. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERT ON THE WITNESS STAND
An expert witness must have "specialized knowledge ... to assist the trier
of fact."'96 If the witness's theories have not been demonstrated to be accurate, the
judge cannot determine whether "expert" opinions based on the theories are of
assistance. "If the jury is in as good a position to reach a decision as the expert,
expert testimony would be of little assistance to the jury and should not be
admitted."'97 "The principal question has been not whether psychiatric testimony
is relevant in criminal cases, but whether its usefulness is outweighed by its lack of
trustworthiness."' 98
When a mechanistic determinist testifies as an expert on issues of free will
in the courtroom,"9 he or she may introduce more confusion than clarity. Cases that
involve psychology often pit one mental health professional against another in a
196 FED. R EviD. 703; DEMONSTRATIVEEVIDENCE, supra note 185, at 426. But see Richard J.
Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process:
The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 461-495 (1980) (contending that courts
should allow mental health professionals to offer opinions as expert witnesses even though their
opinions are not supported by empirical research).
197 State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn. 1982); see Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter
R.R., 882 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that an expert may not testify "to lay matters which
ajury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert's help"); see also United States v.
Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 971 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding expert testimony on hazards of eyewitness
identifications may be excluded because "these hazards are well within the ken of most lay jurors" and
because the defendant's attorney could discuss those hazards in argument), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 935
(1993); cf In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The trial
judge ought to insist that a proffered expert bring to the jury more than the lawyers can offer in
argument.").
199 Slobogin, supra note 159, at 844 (citing J. ZIsKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (2d ed. 1975)); See also Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 196, at 466-495;
Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL.
L. REV. 527, 600-611 (1978); Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the
Courtroom?, 38 MD. L. REV. 539 (1979); Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of
Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV.
1084, 1094-1101 (1976) ("there is no empirical evidence to support the position that psychiatrists have
any special expertise in accurately predicting dangerousness." Id. at 1099.).
199 As indicated in the Statement on the Insanity Defense of the American Psychiatric
Association, many deterministic psychiatrists recognize that the moral issue raised when they are called
to testify is that of free will. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY
DEFENSE 8 (1982). For a further example of such thought in psychiatry, see ALAN A. STONE,
PSYCHIATRY AND VIOLENCE, IN LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND MORALITY 53 (1984); Alan A. Stone,
Psychiatry and Morality: Three Criticisms, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND MORALITY 219-24 (1984).
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"battle of the experts." This is common in modem litigation, but in this setting, the
two sides often express fundamentally different views of the nature of humanity.
A good example of this took place in the trial of Dan White, who was
charged with the murder of two prominent San Francisco officials. The defense
called psychiatrist Dr. Jerry Jones as one of its mental health experts. On cross-
examination, the prosecutor explored Jones's views about the nature of White's
decisions as White took his gun, went to city hall, entered through a window, and
fired his gun nine times at the victims. Dr. Jones insisted that: "A person cannot
make choices. It's not possible to make choices .... ."" The prosecutor let this
testimony pass, but the issue came up again:
Q. Was he at that time capable, just prior to the
shooting, of making a decision: Shall I shoot him
or shall I not?.. . . I am asking you if he was
capable?
A. I thought we already decided you can't not make a decision.
Q. You did .... [I]s it true at this time?
A. You can't not act. So he was capable of acting,
behaving, and he was behaving.
Q. He made a choice, didn't he?
A. Okay. I said you can't not make a decision. Yes.
Yes.
20'
Here the prosecutor is using the term "decision" as a basis for imposing moral and
legal responsibility. In other words, if White decided and chose to shoot the
officials, he was responsible for his actions and guilty of murder. Dr. Jones,
however, was using the same terms as though decisions were the inevitable result
of being alive. "Deciding, choosing, acting - these bear no connotations of self-
actuation, and thus they are compatible with a view that all conduct is determined
by physical factors."20 2
White's case was built upon the denial of final-cause determinism in his
actions. Of course, if White's behavior were not a matter of free will or final
causation, the defense had to explain his action with some other efficient or material
cause. His lawyers again called upon a psychological expert to do this. Dr. Martin
200 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 27
(1995).
201 Id. at 27.
Id. at 27-28 (comments of George Fletcher).
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Blinder focused on the impact of what people eat, especially what Dan White ate
prior to the killings. Dr. Blinder testified that: "there is a substantial body of
evidence that in susceptible individuals large quantities of what we call junk food,
high sugar content food with lots of preservatives, can precipitate anti-social and
even violent behavior."2 '3 He concluded that
[I]f it were not for all the tremendous pressures on [Dan White] the
weeks prior to the shooting, and perhaps if it were not for the
ingestion of this aggravating factor, this junk food, with all three
factors, did not impinge upon him at the same time, I would
suspect that these homicides would not have taken place.204
As George Fletcher concludes, "[i]t seems to carry no weight at all that there were
thousands of people who ate the same diet, hated their bosses, and lived under
constant pressure but did not resort to killing."2 °' Yet, with testimony like this from
expert witnesses, Dan White was found not guilty of murder and convicted of the
lesser charge of manslaughter.
To the extent that environmental factors affect behavior, some measure of
uncertainty will always be associated with social scientific knowledge?.'° Research
may support experts who testify that cross-racial identifications are generally less
accurate than same-race identifications,2 7 but research can never support an expert
opinion on the accuracy of a given eyewitness identification. Similarly, an expert
might testify that cigarette advertising generally leads people to smoke more, but
such testimony could not prove that this was the cause of a given individual's
203 Id. at 31-32.
204 Id. at 31. For similar arguments made in other case, see WILSON, supra note 116, at 17
(testifying expert claims that defendant Lyle Menendez had been "rewired" by abuse he allegedly
suffered at the hands of his parents); ia at 19 (testifying expert said there was a "one hundred percent
and absolute" chance that defendant would kill again).
205 FLETCHER, supra note 200, at 32.
206 Thus, a class action asserting that a group became addicted to cigarettes due to the actions
of tobacco companies would make little sense. Different environmental factors would have influenced
individual plaintiffs in different ways. Some people might have started smoking to lose weight, others
due to peer pressure, others because their parents did, etc. Differences in these environmental factors
would mean that the issues would vary in each of the case histories. As such, "smokers" logically
could not be a valid class.
207 See generally Sheri L. Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984).
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smoking habit. In Dan White's case, no expert could with certainty say that junk
food caused him to go on a killing spree.2" "Unless expert testimony ... can be
made defendant-specific .. . it will always be irrelevant to the issue of the
particular defendant's mental state."2' In other words, expert testimony on efficient
causation is of little help in a trial designed to determine the final cause of behavior.
When experts testify to non-scientific "findings," they inevitably
intermingle their science with their view of public policy?1" In purporting to
explain the facts to the jury, these experts testify as to what they think the legal rule
should be.2 ' Thus, in testifying that the defendant suffers from battered woman's
208 Dr. Blinder, the expert in Dan White's trial, conducted no tests, had no precise diagnostic
information about White's blood sugar level at the time of the killings, and had no control group to test
his prediction of when and how individuals are driven to kill. FLETCHER, supra note 200, at 32.
209 Note, Feasibility and Admissibility of Mob Mentality Defenses, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1111,
1126 (1995). "Expert testimony on mob behavior is not helpful to the fact-finder, whose role it is to
ascertain the state of mind of the defendant. Equally fundamentally, such expert testimony is irrelevant
so long as it is not linked to the particular defendant on trial." Id. at 1126.
210 THE CIzIENs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RiGHTS, PSYCHIATRY ERADICATING JUSTICE 8 (1995)
(quoting Jeffrey Harris, Executive Director of the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime).
What amazes me is that in any trial I've ever heard of, the defense psychiatrist
always says the accused is insane, and the prosecuting psychiatrist always says
he's sane. This happened invariably, in 100 percent of the cases, thus far
exceeding the laws of chance. You have to ask yourself, 'What is going on here?'
The insanity defense is being used as a football and quite frankly, you'd be better
off calling Central Casting to get 'expert psychiatric testimony' in a criminal trial.
Id "It is unlikely that toxicologists would be tolerated in courts of law if one would observe that he
found a large quantity of arsenic in the body of a deceased person, and another stated that he found by
the same operation none." Id. (quoting Thomas Szasz). But see JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS 0.
MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CASES-LEGISLATION-POLICIES 682 (2d ed.
1992) (reporting on Environmental Protection Agency hearings at which several eminently qualified
pathologists disagreed as to whether tumors on dissected mice were cancerous).
211 In the introduction to The Battered Woman, Lenore Walker wrote:
I am aware that this book is written from a feminist vision. It is a picture if what
happens in a domestic violent act from the perspective of only one of the two
parties. The men do not have equal rebuttal time. Rather, I view women as
victims in order to understand what the toll of such domestic violence is like for
them. Unfortunately, in doing so I tend to place all men in an especially negative
light, instead ofjust those men who commit such crimes.
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN xvii (1979). While this viewpoint could well be
appropriate for the author of a book, Dr. Walker testified frequently in court as an expert on this issue.
See WILSON, supra note 116, at 48-49 (raising questions about the value of her testimony in certain
cases).
While the Battered Woman's defense has been generally well received by the courts, other
defenses have not fared as well. See United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1984) (pathological
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syndrome and reasonably thought that harm was imminent212 the expert may really
be testifying that a battered woman should be permitted to kill in self-defense, even
in the absence of imminent harm? 13 A similar analysis would apply when an expert
testifies that an alcoholic could not resist a second drink2 14 As such, ostensibly
descriptive testimony by the expert witness is often nothing more than a normative
judgment.
2 15
Courts accept the findings of scientists who are not in the courtroom,
statements that would otherwise be deemed hearsay, because of the reliability of the
scientific method. To the extent that findings reflect personal values rather than
scientific observation, the traditional hearsay dangers become implicated and pose
substantial prejudice to the opponent of the evidence who cannot cross examine the
researcher to uncover bias.216 There is no reason to believe that triers of fact, when
gambling defense asserted without success); Jennifer L. Grossman, Postpartum Psychosis - A Defense
to Criminal Responsibility or Just Another Gimmick?, 67 U. DET. L. REv. 311 (1990); Michael J.
Davidson, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Controversial Defense for Veterans of a Controversial
War, 29 WM. & MARYL. REV. 415, 421 (1988).
212 Some courts limit expert testimony to a description of the general syndrome and the
characteristics which are present in a person suffering from the syndrome. See, e.g., State v. Hennum,
441 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1989) (limiting testimony in future cases).
213 Wilson explains how. the "learned helplessness" which is a cornerstone of the Battered
Woman's defense is directly derived from testing conducted on dogs. WILSON, supra note 116, at 52.
Moreover, this part of the theory seems to be at odds with the action (killing the abusive partner) that
the woman has undertaken. Id. at 53. Such inconsistencies are possible only because the theory
attempts to account for human behavior, but the testing is based exclusively on efficient- and material-
cause theory. See id. at 57 ("[Ihe evidence for the existence of a syndrome was, in the case of Dr.
Walker [the person most responsible for developing the Battered Woman's Syndrome], elicited by
interviewers who were predisposed to find it.").
214 See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 24 (3d ed. 1976) (discussing the trouble many alcoholics have
resisting a second drink).
215 An expert's non-scientific opinion may or may not be accurate, and no way exists for the jury
to properly evaluate it. Presented with conflicting opinions,,jurors have no well-founded basis on
which to choose between them. Juries are impaneled to decide disputed facts, not policy matters.
When policy issues are resolved through expert testimony, parties who cannot afford experts (or well
qualified experts) essentially lose their right of representation. Thus, in assisting the finder of fact,
experts should be limited to factual testimony.
216 Additionally, even though experts who testify about their own research can be cross-
examined, their testimony is properly susceptible to a hearsay objection. No mature research program
stands by itself. Science is a cumulative enterprise based upon the contributions of many researchers
over the course of many years. Thus, in-court scientific testimony usually rests on a good deal of out-
of-court hearsay.
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provided with relevant studies, cannot assess many matters such as these as well as
an expert would.21 7 Once again, this sidesteps the question, "can an expert who
does not believe in free will and final causation really be an expert in a trial
designed to determine these issues?" Much expert testimony that is routinely
accepted in American courts comes from such experts.
X. CONCLUSION
Most mental health professionals seeking to provide treatment vary their
techniques and select a particular theory of behavior to find what works best with
a given client."' This cannot be the approach taken by the law. As a matter of
practical necessity, the legal system must choose a theory of human behavior to
inform its structure without knowing the identity or psyche of each of the actors.2 9
As such, any theory that is employed must look at the full picture of human
behavior; it must involve all four of Aristotle's causes.
The legal system has long focused on final causation, with perhaps too little
attention being given to efficient causation. Efficient causation certainly can
influence human behavior, but it is only part of the equation. As the legal system
seeks to piece together the full picture it has - as it always does - turned to the
experts in the field for guidance. Too often, however, the experts are only expert
in half of the picture.
Because psychology jettisoned final (and largely formal) causation in favor
of material and efficient causation, its theories are incomplete and inconsistent with
the demands of the legal system. Most modem psychologists do not even accept the
possibility of final causation, which is still the primary focus of the law. This
means that their opinions are not only incomplete, but are based on a view of human
behavior that is incompatible with the legal system. It also means that the
experiments they conduct are infected from the beginning with an efficient cause
bias.
217 Morse, supra note 174, at 620 ("Without hard, methodologically sound quantitative data,
the guess of an expert is unlikely to be better than the guess of laypersons").
218 Shuman, supra note 117, at 166 (citing Daniel W. Shuman & Myron F. Weiner, The
Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV.
893, 921 (1982)).
219 Id. at 166.
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Lawyers and judges must recognize these limitations when evaluating
mental health experts for guidance in the courtroom?20 If this is done, not only
might the sciences of psychology and psychiatry be forced to re-examine some of
their basic assumptions (which need to be re-examined), bit the administration of
justice will be served by the use of experts who accept the most fundamental
premises of our legal system - free will and personal responsibility.
220 One might imagine a witness on the stand to testify as to whether the defendant knew the
nature and quality of his or her actions and whether he or she could conform the behavior to the
requirements of the law. One logical question to ask before the witness is certified as an expert is
whether the witness accepts the possibility of free will. If the witness is true to the core propositions
of his or her science, that question will usually be answered in the negative. If the witness accepts the
possibility of free will, numerous psychological studies could be used for cross-examination purposes.
Either way, the witness' expert status is seriously called into question.
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